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CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: EVOLVING RESTRIC-
TIONS ON THE URGE TO MERGEt
It would be wrong to say that the European Community's com-
petition policy has been a failure. You can only call something a
failure if it happens to have gotten going and still not made it. Noth-
ing of the sort here - far from having gotten going, the competition
policy of the Commission of the European Communities is distin-
guished first and foremost by its absence. Inaction, deliberate inac-
tion, is the word - and that in a field in which the Treaty of Rome
did assign precise political aims to the Commission. For in no other
field is the Commission given such free rein (it can fine firms up to
a million dollars or 10%c of their turnover). In other sectors it has
shown that it possesses some political courage; but here it has pre-
ferred not to recognize the part which effective action could have
played from 1959 onwards in integrating Europe and stimulating
other European policies.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The antitrust posture of the European Economic Community 2 (EEC),
especially in the area of close-knit combinations,8 has changed markedly
since that stinging criticism of late 1970. In moving from this alleged
nonfeasance, the EEC Commission,4 as evidenced by its recently proposed
anti-merger regulations, has demonstrated a rather impressive degree of
sophistication within a very short time. And, although the Commission's
competition policy is still in its formative years, some firmly implanted
legal and extralegal principles have already been established.
Practical considerations alone should justify American interest in
the evolving merger controls of the EEC. Acquisitions of European-
based enterprises by American multinational corporations have continued
t The author expresses his appreciation to Professor Peter E. Herzog of Syra-
cuse University College of Law for providing the opportunity to research the material
included herein and for aiding in the review of the initial manuscript.
1. Moss, The European Community Still Has No Competition Policy, Le Monde
de l'Economie, Dec. 15, 1970, at 14, in 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 443 (1971) (transl.).
2. The European Economic Community is fundamentally an economic, political,
and legal union among nine European countries: Belgium, Denmark, England, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands.
3. The term "close-knit combinations" generally will be used to designate
alliances among firms which are accomplished by the merger or consolidation of the
firms into a single ownership unit subject to a unified control. See J. BAIN, INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 479 (1959).
4. The EEC Commission performs both legislative and supervisory functions.
See notes 41-49 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 273-354 and accompanying text infra.
(420)
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to climb.6 Such activity is subject, of course, to the antitrust limitations
of the particular host nation.7 And, with the extraterritorial reach of
American restrictions, potential violations of the Sherman Act,8 Clayton
Act,9 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 0 should also
be considered. However, merger activity within the common market
countries is controlled, significantly and preeminently, by the Treaty of
Rome which created the EEC."
6. It has been predicted that by 1975 the third largest industrial power in the
world will be American-controlled industry in Europe. Vagts, The Multinational
Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 739, 748
(1970).
For a number of tables dealing with American multinational enterprises and
their European acquisition activity, see BUSINESS INT'L INFORMATION Sys., AcQUISI-
TIONS IN EUROPE: CAUSES OF CORPORATE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES (J. Kitching
Report) 39-54 (1973).
The following statistics are included to describe acquisitions by 187 American
companies:
Annual
Host Country 1946-57 1958-67 % Growth
United Kingdom- 67 282 12.5
France - 22 201 23.0
Germany 35 177 16.0
Italy 13 135 25.0
Belguim/Lux. 9 77 22.0
Scandinavia 13 74 16.5
Netherlands 11 66 17.5
Id. at 43, citing J. VAUPAL & J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE (1969).
For statistics indicating even greater expansion of general American invest-
ments since 1967, see U.S. Investments in EEC, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. % 9387, at 8838-39 (1970). The COmmission, however, has stated
that in 1971 the participation of non-member country enterprises in international
operations, while substantial, declined in proportion to the number of concentration
operations involving only Common Market firms. ECSC, EEC, EURATOM COMMIS-
SION, SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECOND
COMMISSION REPORT].
7. However, these limitations are often relatively insignificant. See notes 345-47
and accompanying text infra.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Foreign acquisitions have figured prominently in
the past in conspiracy and monopolization actions brought pursuant to sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead CO., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), modified and aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; cf. United States v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. CO., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (jointly owned foreign subsidiaries).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (1970). See Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and
Mergers Involving American and Foreign Corporations Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 38, 76-125 (1967).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970). See, e.g., Continental Baking Co., [1959-1963
Transfer Binder], TRADE REG. REP. 1 27,885 (FTC 1959).
11. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957.
The English version, which became authentic January 1, 1973, with the accession
of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, is also set forth in 1 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. g 151 (1973) (citation to the Rome Treaty will be to the CCH Common
Market Reporter unless otherwise stated).
The treaty became effective January 1, 1958. Some provisions of the Rome
Treaty as signed by the original six member states in 1957 have been amended, re-
placed, or repealed by the Treaty of April 8, 1965, which established a single Council
and a single Commission of the European Communities. The Merger Treaty, 1
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 5115. Further amendment was provided by the Treaty
of Accession, signed on January 22, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 7001 (1973).
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The Treaty of Rome established more than a customs union. 12 Its
far-reaching, ultimate purposes are reflected in article 2,13 which calls for
the promotion of harmonious economic development, balanced expansion
and stability, and closer relations within the EEC. This goal of economic
integration naturally demands a certain harmonization of the legal as well
as the economic postures of the member states. 14 The Treaty, unlike other
international treaties, created its own legal order, integrated with those
of the member states and enforceable by their domestic courts.15 More
than a treaty, but establishing less than a federation,' 6 the pre-eminence
of its law necessarily limits the sovereignty of the member state,' 7 directly
establishing enforceable legal rights and obligations within the Community.'
8
12. A customs union was established pursuant to the provisions of Rome Treaty
article 9, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 201 (1973), which provides for the elimination
of customs duties on imports and exports between member states and the adoption of
a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries. For a general dis-
cussion of the customs union and its dynamic role in the functioning of the EEC,
see D. McLACHLAN & D. SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY 3-25 (1967).
13. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 165 (1973).
14. For example, prohibition of discriminatory internal tax charges which would
indirectly replace the tariff barrier between member states is provided by article 95
of the Rome Treaty. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 3001. For analysis of the problems
and Treaty solutions to discriminatory turnover taxes, see Antal, Harmonisation of
Turnover Taxes in the Common Market, 1 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 41-57 (1963). See
also M. VON DER GROEBEN, COMPETITION POLICY AS PART OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE
COMMON MARKET 6 (1965) (address by M. von der Groeben, Member of the Com-
mission of the EEC, President of the Competition Group).
15. Article 5 of the Rome Treaty provides in part:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 181 (1973). These obligations may include not only
the appropriate Treaty articles but also certain regulations and directives issued by the
Council and Commission. Regulations have general applicability, are binding in every
respect and are directly applicable in each member state. Directives are binding in
respect to the result to be achieved, but the manner of their enforcement is a matter
for the national authorities. Article 189, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 1 4901 (1971).
The Court of Justice, in Costa v. ENEL, Court of Justice Case No. 6/64,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 8023 (1964), held that the
pre-eminence of EEC law is confirmed by article 189. Rights created by the Treaty
of Rome cannot be contradicted by internal law without undermining the legal basis
of the EEC. Id. 1 8023, at 7390-91. As to the procedural aspects of the operation
of the Court of Justice under article 177, see note 57 and accompanying text infra.
For other cases concerning the application of EEC law by national courts, see L.
BRINKHORST & I-. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
103-17 (1969). For a discussion of the effect the EEC has upon various national
constitutions, see id. at 136-76. For a general discussion of the relationship between
EEC law and national law, see Ipsen, The Relationship of the Law Between the
European Communities and National Law, 2 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 379-402 (1965).
16. See generally Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction Over Antitrust
Matters in the European Economic Community, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1964).
17. The shift by member states from a national order to the EEC legal order,
and the rights and obligations created by the Rome Treaty, necessarily concerns a
limitation of individual sovereign rights which subsequent unilateral action cannot
affect. Costa v. ENEL, Court of Justice Case No. 6/64, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8023, at 7391 (1964).
18. Community law establishes a "new legal order." Van Gend & Loos v. Nether-
lands Fiscal Administration, Court of Justice Case No. 26/62, [1961-1966 Transfer
Binder] CCH COMM. MIKT. REP. 1 8008, at 7214 (1963). The court observed that "the
[VOL. 19
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Undistorted competition, recognized as one of the prime tools in
effecting Community policy, 19 is regulated on such a level; through the
implementing regulation 17,20 the antitrust proscriptions of articles 85
and 86 are directly enforceable within each member state.2 1 Thus, the
American corporation contemplating a merger involving a Community
enterprise is directly confronted with a regulatory scheme oftentimes more
imposing than that of the host nation itself.22 Furthermore, the Court of
Justice has clearly stated that a parent firm, not located within the Com-
munity, which effects an acquisition through a subsidiary located outside
of the member states, will have such conduct imputed directly to it.238 An
American multinational corporation, therefore, cannot insulate itself from
EEC competition law. In addition, although there has never been an
announced anti-American policy, it is well known that the EEC rules of
competition reflect a "particularly deep concern . . . over any dominant
position of large, financially powerful firms from non-member countries.1
2 4
It is perhaps more than coincidental that the most significant Court of
Justice decision in this area, Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v.
role of the Court of Justice . . . confirms the fact that the States have acknowledged
that Community law has an authority which may be invoked before such courts by
their nationals." Id. This is ensured procedurally through Rome Treaty, article 177.
See note 57 and accompanying text infra; Machaw, Ensuring the Observance of Law
in the Interpretation and Application of the EEC Treaty: The Role and Functioning
of the Revoi D'Interpretation Under Article 177 (pts. 1-2), 7 COMM. MKT. L. REV.
258-85, 423-53 (1970).
19. See M. VON DER GROEBEN, supra note 14, at 1; ECSC, EEC, EURATOM,
COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 11-15 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as FIRST COMMISSION REPORT]. The competition policy is inextricably tied in with
the so-called regional and industrial policies of the Community. See text accompany-
ing notes 71-86 infra. See also EEC Commission, Industrial Policy in the Community;
Memorandum From the Commission to the Council, 11/18-11/22 (Mar. 18, 1970)
[hereinafter cited Industrial Memo].
20. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. I 2401-2634 (1972). See notes 66-70 and accom-
panying text infra.
21. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
22. Belgium's antitrust law, for example, authorizes action against "practices that
distort or restrict the normal play of competition." C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS
AND MONOPOLIES - AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 344 (1967). By not discrimi-
nating between restrictive trade agreements and market-dominating firms, Belgian
internal law is favorable to the unrestricted development of economic power since
there is no presumption that cartels or concentrations are contrary to public interest.
See R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 145 (1970);
Seutens, Belgian Antitrust Law "In Action," 2 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 325 (1965). Such
a difference between internal and EEC antitrust policies may make it difficult to obtain
acceptance of the harsher EEC policies. See notes 345-47 and accompanying text infra.
23. Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, Court of Justice Case
No. 6/72, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8171 (1973).
This principle has been significantly strengthened by the Court of Justice's
recent refusal to reverse the Commission in its action against the American com-
pany, Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC), and its Italian subsidiary, Institute
Chemioterapico Italiano (ICI). The Court of Justice held that a parent company
domiciled outside the EEC but controlling a subsidiary there could be held jointly
and severally responsible for the subsidiary's conduct. ICI and Commercial Solvents
Corp. v. Commission, Court of Justice Case Nos. 6, 7/73, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8209 (1974). See note 173 infra.
24. M. VON DER GROEBEN, supra note 14, at 1.
COMMENTS
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Commission,25 involved an American corporation seeking further exten-
sion of its European influence.
An analysis of the EEC competition policy is also interesting from
a comparative standpoint. Traditionally, EEC competition rules have
been said to be based on a model strikingly different from the neo-classical
tradition of American antitrust26 which reflects ultimate confidence in the
perfectly competitive marketplace.2 7  Proscriptions based upon control of
conduct rather than of the marketplace have been a generally accepted
orientation of EEC controls. 28 Such regulations, aimed directly at the
25. Court of Justice Case No. 6/72, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 8171 (1973).
26. Neoclassical theorists argue that lack of perfect competition will necessarily
result in fewer goods at higher prices as well as misallocation of resources. See A.
AGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932).
27. This is to be contrasted with an approach which expresses ultimate confidence
in the ability to control the evils which are said to flow from a non-competitive
marketplace. Both the "structure" and "abuse" theory of American antitrust law are
aimed at the existence, acquisition, or maintenance of overwhelming power. See G.
HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
18-169 (1958).
The structure theory was elevated to prominence in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter referred to as Alcoa].
Judge Hand found illegal monopolization from the mere existence of monopoly power
itself in the absence of proof that the monopoly was not "thrust upon" the defendant.
Id. at 431. By permitting only such a narrow "excuse" for monopoly, the existence
of monopoly power became almost synonymous with the proscribed monopolization.
A year later, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The authorities support the view that the material consideration in determining
whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition
actually is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or to exclude com-
petition when it is desired to do so.
Id. at 811. The Court also noted:
Neither proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion
of existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopoliza-
tion under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 810. The mere existence of power to monopolize, if accompanied by the pur-
pose or intent to exert it, constitutes an evil at which the Sherman Act is aimed.
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 130 (1948); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 n.9 (1948) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948).
Even the abuse theory, forerunner to the structure theory and Alcoa, was
directed at the tactics of maintaining or acquiring power as opposed to misbehavior
in the sense of power misuse. Thus monopolization could be found even before a
restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act was found. Monopolization
would be invoked where there was "ungentlemanly conduct" in dealing with one's
competitors. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160
(1947). However, it is clear that percentage of control maintained was still a signifi-
cant factor. Id.
Even after Alcoa and the popularization of the structure theory, abusive
behavior remained significant in the determination of illegal monopolization. In United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), the offense of monopolization was found where size was
buttressed by conduct that was less competitive than possible. See C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 107 (1959). United Shoe, however, has been cited by
European commentators seeking a link between the American concept of abuse and a
structural development of the European notion of abusive behavior. See notes 188-92
and accompanying text infra.
See generally Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, International Aspects of Antitrust, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 375-77 (1966) (statements by Mr. Barbor and Mr. Rahl).
28. See notes 129-38 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 19
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evils sought to be eliminated, might be one answer to the American plea
for "a more analytical, factually based approach. '29 It will be shown,
however, that the different models are not necessarily vastly different in
application, especially where common end-results are sought. That simi-
larity is significant not only because it may indicate an outside affirmation
of the long American experience but also because convergence of the two
systems could lay the groundwork for an eventual, common trans-Atlantic
antitrust law.80
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze, with the above thoughts
in mind, the present, proposed, and probable developments in the regula-
tion of close-knit combinations, or concentrations, in the EEC. 1 A close-
knit combination, as opposed to a cartel, involves some type of control
relationship between the coacting enterprises.8 2 Certainly, merger-induced
concentrations and amalgamations of share capital exhibit such a rela-
tionship. As will be demonstrated, control may be also manifested by
rights to assets and certain other contractual relationships. On the other
hand, cartels, which entail loose association of economically and legally
distinct enterprises, do not involve this control element and will not be
considered in this Comment. 3
Only the EEC and its regulations are directly within the scope of this
Comment. "Common Market" generically describes not only the EEC,
but the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 8 4 and the European
29. Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
63 (1972).
30. See Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust
Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L LAW 75, 93-94 (1973).
31. "Concentration," within the meaning of this comment, shall refer to economic
concentrations effected through close-knit combinations between enterprises. See note
3 supra. Concentration of economic power achieved solely through internal growth
will not be covered as such. On the other hand, concentrations may be brought about
through more than outright stock or asset acquisition. The Commission has clearly
indicated that the following may fall within the ambit of "concentration": 1) financial
participation by companies in other companies; 2) merger of formerly legally inde-
pedent companies; 3) the interlocking of companies on a personal basis, where the
same persons are managers or members of the supervisory boards of legally inde-
pendent companies; 4) arrangements, particularly contractual, which put legally inde-
pendent enterprises under management or control of another enterprise. Memorandum
of the EEC Commission to the Governments of the Member States, Concentration of
Enterprises in the Common Market, Dec. 1, 1965, in CCH Common Market Reports,
No. 26, 1 21, Mar. 17, 1966 [hereinafter cited Commission Memorandum].
For the expanded definition of "concentrations" that would be applied under the
Commission's recently proposed regulation, see text accompanying notes 289-91 infra.
32. Control would appear to include any arrangement which subjects one enter-
prise to management by another. The recently proposed regulations would find control
sufficient to qualify a business relationship as a combination in any right or contract
which would "make it possible to determine how a firm shall operate." See text
accompanying notes 289-91 infra.
33. Such agreements lack the element of economic control found in concentrations.
See note 31 supra. The Commission would distinguish the questioned agreement from
a concentration if it results in "no permanent change in the ownership but a coordi-
nation of the market behavior of enterprises that remain economically independent."
Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, 58.
34. The ECSC was created by the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and The Netherlands on April 18, 1951, and taking effect on July 25,
COMMENTS
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Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 3 5 as well. The three were pro-
cedurally integrated in 1966,80 but each has maintained an independent
legal status. However, since the ECSC, as the forerunner of the EEC
created a certain psychological foundation in European competition policy,
it will be tangentially considered.
This Comment will be developed in five stages: The first part will
provide the framework necessary for an appreciation of Community com-
petition law generally, and control of concentrations specifically. This will
include consideration of the basic procedural aspects and legal provisions
of EEC law, as well as the extralegal interests which, in light of the tra-
ditional teleological interpretation 7 given EEC law by the Court of
Justice, play a crucial role in the competition policy of the EEC.
The second part will consider the theoretical and potential applica-
bility of article 85 of the Treaty of Rome 38 as an anti-merger tool. Tailored
more to cartels than concentrations, article 85 has heretofore been shunned
by the Commission as such a tool, but its existence as a potential Com-
mission weapon or as the basis of private action cannot be ignored.
The third part will deal with the pre-Continental Can interpretation
of article 86,39 the present source of power for the Commission's policy.
Proscribing the "abuse of a dominant position," this article's applicability
to mergers effected by less than predatory practices was doubted, at least
by some observors outside of the Commission, until the Court of Justice's
definitive decision in Continental Can.
Fourth will be an analysis of the reasoning, holding, and implications
of Continental Can. Arguably based on a somewhat tortured reading of
article 86, and apparently inspired more by the fundamental Treaty aims,
this decision has given the Commission widespread but as yet ill-defined
powers. By bringing a merger which effects further growth of a domi-
nant position within the scope of "abuse," the Court of Justice has perhaps
sought a structural regulation of the marketplace in the guise of article
86's behavior controls. Some basic comparisons with the American
system, with its reliance on the structural theory, will aid in this analysis.
The final part will deal with the Commission's draft regulation on
the control of concentrations, announced July 20, 1973.40 Threatening
1952. For official translation, see EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1973).
The ECSC was limited to regulation of the basic commodities of the coal
and steel sector. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 101.38, at 120 (1965).
35. Treaty establishing Euratom was signed concurrently with the Treaty of
Rome on March 25, 1957, becoming effective on January 1, 1958. See TREATIES, supra
note 34, for official translation.
36. The Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single COmmission of the
European Communities was signed April 8, 1965 and became effective 1966. 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 11 5116-81 (1966). For a detailed analysis of this integration, see
Houben, The Merger of the Executives of the European Communities, 3 CoMm. MKT.
L. REV. 37-89 (1965).
37. See note 88 infra.
38. The text of article 85 is set forth in note 63 infra.
39. The text of article 86 is set out in note 64 infra.
40. 2 CCH COMM. MET. REP. 9586 (1973).
[VOL. 19426
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articles 85 and 86 with obsolescence in this area, the proposed regulation
marks the first attempt to implement a truly systematic and comprehen-
sive arrangement.. Five major areas will be dealt with in the analysis of
this proposed regulation: (1) its preliminary inspirations; (2) mechanics
of its application; (3) possible origin of its operative terms; (4) theo-
retical problems in its formulation; and (5) the possibility of its accept-
ance by the Council. Whether or not it is ultimately accepted in its
present form, the effort alone evidences new direction and sophistication
in the control of concentrations.
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMUNITY PROCESS
A. Legal
1. Community institutions
Before undertaking a specific analysis of the relevant EEC law, it is
important to first understand the basic functions of, and interrelationships
among, the four Community institutions: Commission, Council, Parliament
and Court of Justice. Each has and will play a particular part in the
development of the EEC law regarding concentrations.
The Commission 4' is crucial to both the creation and administration
of Community law. This apolitical body,42 initiates Community legislation
by submitting draft regulations 4" and directives4" to the Council. 45 Because
the Commission has the sole power to set a proposal in motion, while
the Council maintains ultimate power of rejection, there is dynamic inter-
play and compromise between the two bodies in the legislative process.
As the Community "watchdog," the Commission is also charged with the
implementation and application of Community law, and has the right and
duty to take action against violating member states or firms. 46 Specifically
in the area of antitrust, the Commission has extensive powers. The Com-
41. The general function, obligations, and make-up of the Commission is set forth
in Rome Treaty, articles 155-63, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 7f 4471-4512 (1967),
as amended by the Merger Treaty, 2 CCH COMM. MXT. REP. 7T 5115-95 (1966).
See note 11 supra. There were further modifications by the Treaty of Accessioni
signed January 22, 1972 and ratified by Denmark, Great Britain, and Ireland which
provided for entry of those countries into the Common Market on that latter date.
Note that the number on the COmmission was increased from nine to thirteen. Treaty
of Accession, article 15, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 7055 (1972).
42. Article 157, section 2, of the Rome Treaty provides in part:
The members of the Commission shall act completely independently in the
performance of their duties, in the general interest of the Community.
In the performance of their duties, they shall neither seek nor take instruc-
tions from any Government or other body.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 4481 (1967).
43. Regulations are directly binding and applicable within the member states, and
are enforceable by their domestic courts. Rome Treaty, article 189, 2 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. % 4901 (1971).
44. Directives, while binding upon member states, may be enforced by them in
a discretionary manner. Rome Treaty, article 189, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 4901
(1971).
45. Rome Treaty, article 149, 2 CCH COMM. MET. REP. f 4421 (1967), permits the
Council, when acting on a COmmission proposal, to amend it only by a unanimous vote.
46. Rome Treaty, article 155, 2 CCH COMm. MKT. REP. 4471 (1967).
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mission is empowered to directly impose substantial penalties on a firm
violating articles 85 or 86,4 7 provided the enterprise concerned is afforded
a full hearing.48 When making its decision the Commission acts as in-
vestigator, prosecutor, and judge, subject to review on questions of law
and fact by the Court of Justice.
49
The Council of Ministers, 50 composed of nine members - one per
member state - is the only institution whose members directly represent
their national governments. 51 Having been granted the essential powers
for enacting normative regulations and directives, the Council is becom-
ing increasingly powerful vis-A-vis the Commission. 52 This new strength
has given rise to a tendency for the Community decision-making process
to consist more of diplomatic negotiation than of apolitical and autono-
mous analysis. As will be demonstrated, this fact will play a large role
in the eventual fate of the proposed Commission regulation on control of
concentrations now before the Council.
The European Parliament, 58 composed of representatives appointed
from the national parliaments, possesses only nominal democratic control
over the Community institutions.54 At present, its function is limited to
giving advisory opinions on Commission proposals, drafting its own pro-
47. Regulation 17, article 3, provides in part:
(1) If, acting on request or ex officio, the Commission finds that an enterprise
or association of enterprises is infringing Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it
can by means of a decision oblige the enterprise or associations of enterprises
concerned to put an end to such infringement
(2) A request to this effect may be submitted by:
(a) Member States;
(b) Natural and legal persons and associations of persons, who show a
justified interest.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 2421 (1971).
48. Hearings are guaranteed by regulation 17, article 19, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT.
REP. f 2581 (1973). Parties are given the right to reply, to inspect the record of the
case, and to have the transcript reviewed. Regulation No. 99/63 sets forth a detailed
set of procedural rights related to such hearings. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2635
(1973).
49. For detailed analysis of the Commission's role in antitrust matters and the
interplay of articles 85 and 86 with regulation 17, see Deringer, The Distribution of
Powers in the Enforcement of the Rules of Competition Under the Rome Treaty,
1 COMM. MxT. L. REv. 30 (1963).
50. The general function, organization, and power of the Council is set forth in
Rome Treaty, articles 145-54, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1111 4401-45 (1967), as
amended by the Merger Treaty, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 5116-95 (1966).
51. Rome Treaty, article 146, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4405 (1967), as
amended by the Merger Treaty, article 2, 2 CCH COMM. MET. REP. 5118 (1966).
52. A number of basic reasons have been cited for this institutional imbalance.
Most importantly, since the so-called "Luxembourg compromise" of January 1966
resulted in an informal agreement within the Council that all important matters
would be passed only upon unanimous consent, the power granted to the Commission
by Rome Treaty, article 149, became less significant in its requirement of a unanimous
vote for the Council to amend a Commission proposal. See COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY EXAMINING THE PROBLEM
OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Report
Vedel) (1972).
53. The general function and power of the European Parliament is set forth in
Rome Treaty, articles 137-44, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 4301-36 (1967).
54. Members are appointed as representatives of their national parliaments and
thus represent the interests of their individual parties; there is presently no direct
suffrage. Rome Treaty, article 138, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4305 (1967).
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posals relating to budgetary matters, and maintaining rights of censure
over Commission members. In spite of these limitations, the Parliament
was instrumental in spurring the Commission's recent draft proposal on
the control of concentrations.
55
Finally, the Court of Justice,5 6 a body of nine appointed judges,
functions as the supreme appellate court for Community law. Article 177
specifically grants the court jurisdiction to issue preliminary rulings con-
cerning the interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the validity of measures
taken by EEC institutions.57 In fulfilling that function, the Court applies
law derived primarily from two sources: the "self-executing" articles of
the Rome Treaty, which are deemed directly applicable to member states58
without need for unilateral national action, and certain secondary sources
in the form of Council regulations which establish a direct legal basis
for individual control. The antitrust proscriptions of articles 85 and 86,
while deemed "self-executing," 59 have been further implemented by regu-
lation 17.
2. Applicable sources of law
The basic EEC competition policy is set forth in article 3(f), which
calls for "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
common market is not distorted. '60 Although this article appears to be
55. See text accompanying notes 284-85 infra.
56. Provisions relating to the Court of Justice are set forth in Rome Treaty,
articles 164-88, 2 CCH COMM. MKr. REP. I l 4601-4716 (1967).
57. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to give preliminary rulings (a titre
prijudiciel) concerning:-
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes if any bodies set up by a formal measure
of the Council, where the said statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before any court of law of one of the
Member States, the said court may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is essential to enable it to render judgment, request the Court of Justice to give
a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court
of a Member State, from whose decision there is no possibility of appeal under
domestic law, the said court is bound to refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 4655 (1968).
For a description of the operation of article 177, see Mashaw, Ensuring the
Observance of Law in the Interpretation and Application of the EEC Treaty: The
Role and Functioning of the Revoi D'Interpretation Under Article 177 (pts. 1-2),
7 CoMM. MKT. L. REv. 258-85, 423-53 (1970). For an analysis of article 177 as it is
applied, see L. BRINKHORST & H. SHERMERS, supra note 15, at 106-07, 110, 160, 179,
180-220, 250, 256-57 (1969).
58. The Court of Justice in Van Gond en Loos v. Netherlands Tax Administra-
tion, Court of Justice Case No. 26/62, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder], CCH CoMm.
MKT. REP. 1 8008 (1963), upon finding article 12 self-executing, described the direct
applicability of that article upon persons within the member states. Id. at 7214-15.
Note the conclusions of Advocate General Karl Roemer who cited articles 85 and 86
as similarly applicable. Id. at 7220.
59. See deGeus v. Bosch, Court of Justice Case No. 13/61, [1961-1966 Transfer
Binder], CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 11 8003 (1962). See also P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE
TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 78 (1972).
60. TREATIES, supra note 34, at 180. Article 3(f) is also set forth in 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. ff 171 (1957).
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merely an outline provision or general program, the Court of Justice has
indicated its binding legal effect in light of the essentiality of its objec-
tive.6 1 At the very least, it provides a general flavor to all EEC com-
petition law, and its broad applicability is partly responsible for the
expansive reading of the other, more limited articles.
62
Article 85 prohibits agreements and concerted practices between
independent enterprises which restrict or distort competition within the
common market, specifically proscribing price-fixing, production limita-
tions, division of markets, commercial discrimination, and tying arrange-
ments.63 In addition to other possible penalties, article 85 provides that
all such agreements shall be deemed automatically null and void. How-
ever, a limited number of exemptions from the article's proscriptions are
available upon an adequate showing that the activity is justified on the
basis of improved production or distribution of goods.
Article 86 declares the abuse of a dominant position to be incom-
patible with common market policies where it affects trade between mem-
ber states.6 4 Void of any possibile exemptions, and specifically applicable
61. Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, Court of Justice Case
No. 6/72, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8171, at 8299 (1973).
62. See text accompanying notes 233-37 infra.
63. Article 85 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
TREATIES, supra note 34, at 245-46 (official transl.). Article 85 is also set forth in
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 111 2005, 2041, 2051 (1973).
64. Article 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
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to single enterprises, it facially appears to be a much more appropriate
basis for merger control policy than article 85.
Article 87, which calls for the rapid implementation of the principles
of articles 85 and 86, provides that the Council, on motion of the Com-
mission, shall enact any needed regulations or directives to ensure com-
pliance with those articles.6 5 Pursuant to this authority, regulation 1766
was enacted by the Council in 1962. In addition to reaffirming the direct
applicability of articles 85 and 86 to the member states,67 the regulation de-
lineates the specific authority of the Commission in these matters,68 includ-
ing its power, upon finding a violation, to order a halt to the practice and
to impose substantial fines.6 9 During Commission proceedings, the accused
concern is entitled to a hearing pursuant to article 19 of the regulation. °
B. Extralegal considerations
EEC competition rules can be understood only with reference to the
general competition policy. In turn, the Commission has often stated that
this "competition policy cannot operate in isolation independent of efforts
made in other fields."' Thus, the undistorted competition called for in
article 3(f) has been construed to require workable, but not perfect
competition - workable in the sense that competition is regarded as a
tool to effect the general economic policy of the Community. 72 Competi-
tion regulations are not primarily aimed towards the achievement of a
purely competitive atomistic economy. Promotion of internecine struggle
between enterprises, merely for the sake of a competitive marketplace,
is not the objective.73 Viewed as a means rather than an end, competi-
tion policy of the EEC, unlike the American approach, appears preoccu-
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchases or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
TREATIES, supra note 34, at 246-47 (official transl.). Article 86 is also set forth in
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2101 (1973).
65. Article 87 is set forth in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 2201 (1973).
66. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2401-2633 (1973).
67. Regulation 17, article 1, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2402 (1973).
68. Regulation 17, article 3, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2421 (1973).
69. Regulation 17, article 16, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2551 (1973), permits
penalties of 50 to 1000 UA (one UA or unit of account is equivalent to an unde-
valued U.S. dollar as of 1971) per day of delay in complying with a Commission order.
70. See note 48 supra.
71. FIRST COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 12.
72. See P. MATHIJSEN', A GUIE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 73 (1972);
Canellos & Silber, Concentration in the Common Market, 7 CoMm. MKT. L. REv. 5,
8-10 (1970).
73. This was made very clear in a 1965 speech by the then President of the
Competition Group. M. voN DER GROEBEN, supra note 14, at 4.
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pied with the promotion of many aims besides mere survival of the
competitive process.
Elimination of all internal economic frontiers within the Community
is a primary aim of the Treaty of Rome. 74 Governmental restrictions and
barriers have been largely abolished through the customs union and supra-
national legal system, and the Commission, naturally, has sought to keep
private fragmentation from replacing the fading national partitions.
7 5
Development of a true continental economy has been the recognized means
of achieving this effect ;76 concentrations at a European level are said to
aid in the transition from the nationally-oriented economy.77 Therefore,
certain concentrations of economic power which span national borders
are likely to be encouraged through the elimination of psychological and
legal obstacles.78 However, the increasing number of international links
between Community undertakings and those of third countries, 79 par-
ticularly the United States, has been considered potentially harmful to
the integration policy.80 While the importance of links with non-member
state firms has been acknowledged, 8' the industrial policy of the Com-
munity has emphasized the countervailing need for the development of
truly transnational European undertakings, financed with European capital
and managed by directors from the member states. 82 This recognition
has been motivated in part by a desire for European firms to improve
their competitive position in order to cope with the economic challenges
posed by non-Community firms.83 Especially in the high technology
industries, large-scale production capacity may be necessary in order to
compete effectively in international trade.8 4 Thus, the Commission has
indicated that it might actually promote affiliations between Community
firms where, for instance, they would result in the pooling of research
or marketing resources, or result in the acquisition of a larger portion
of the market vis-A-vis the United States.8 5 This has recently become
obvious in the computer field where the combination of European com-
74. Id.
75. FIRST COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 13.
76. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 7.
77. Industrial Memo, supra note 19, at 21 and 11/19.
78. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 9.
79. Industrial Memo, supra note 19, at 21.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The Commission has stated:
Trans-national European undertakings should be taken to mean not only under-
takings which spread their activities over several countries, but those of which
the capital and directors come from several countries and of which the manage-
ment centre is situated in Europe.
Id.
83. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 8; Industrial Memo, supra note
19, at 21.
84. See M. voN DER GROEBEN, supra note 14, at 4; Commission Memorandum,
supra note 31, at 8-9.
85. Commission Memorandum, supra note 19, at 8-9.
[VOIL. 19
13
Smith: Control of Concentrations in the European Economic Community: Evo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
FEBRUARY 1974]
puter firms to pool research resources in order to compete effectively
with IBM has been raised as a definite possibility.86
The above fundamental extralegal considerations take on added im-
portance in the interpretation of competition law when it is recognized
that there is little legislative history to provide workable interpretive
guidelines for EEC law.8 T And, more importantly, when subjected to
judicial scrutiny, the articles of the Rome Treaty are often interpreted
teleologically to reflect the so-called "higher aims" of the Treaty.88
III. ARTICLE 8589
The Commission has flatly denied the applicability of article 85 to
concentrations."0 As will be demonstrated, however, there are no insuper-
able textual barriers to such a utilization. A literal reading of the article,
while not disclosing a specific reference to mergers, does not facially
exclude a reference to the close-knit combination. Many of the arguments
set forth by the Commission simply do not compel the inference that
article 85 is inappropriate as an anti-merger device. Therefore, given the
revocability of the Commission's decision not to employ article 85,91
86. Ganging Up on Snow White, TIME, July 2, 1973, at 55 (European ed.).
87. The only real source of preparatory materials is supplied by COMITA INTER-
GOUVERNEMENTAL CRAA PAR LA CONFARENCE DE MESsiNE, RAPPORT DES CHFFS DE
DPLPGATION AUX MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGkRES (Spaak Report) (1956).
While this report has furnished some very general guidelines, it is of little help in
interpretation of antitrust laws.
88. Teleological interpretation refers roughly to the "purpose oriented" reading
of Community law. It has been stated as a general rule that the ultimate task facing
the Court of Justice in interpreting the text of the Treaty of Rome is to reflect the
thinking of the authors. Chevallier, Methods and Reasoning of the European Court
in its Interpretation of Community Law, 2 CoMm. MKT. L. REV. 21, 23 (1964).
Although this proposition sounds too simplistic to be of significant value, this
approach gives rise to certain interpretive effects and provides a hierarchy of analytic
tools which aid in the construction of the treaty. See L. BRINICHORST & H. SCHERMERS,
supra note 15, at 221-23.
Systematic interpretation, applied by the Cotirt of Justice when the literal
language of the text is unclear, construes the provision in question so to best fit the
context of the chapter of the treaty in which it is found. Articles 85 and 86, for
example, have been played against each other - certain features of article 85 have
been "read into" article 86, even where the latter section provided no literal justifica-
tion for the interpretation. See text accompanying notes 238-46 infra. These articles
may also be read so as to conform with the treaty as a whole. This is facilitated by
explicit reference in articles 85 and 86 to proscriptions of anti-competitive activities
which are "incompatible with the Common Market," a reference to the general prin-
ciples espoused in article 3(f). Canellos & Silber, Concentration in the Common
Market, 7 CoMm. MKT. L. REV. 138, 150-51 (1970). This tendency to fill the literal
gaps in such a manner consequently has resulted in a downplay of other interpretive
tools. For example, the use of a contrario reasoning, finding negative implications in
statutory silence, has been declared an unsound judicial principle and has been criti-
cized by the Court of Justice. Id. at 155.
Finally, the Court occasionally has been guided by a so-called "functional
interpretation" in its treatment of treaty law. Seeking to best serve the economic and
political underpinnings of the authors' intent, the Court has reached for a reconcilia-
tion of individual articles with the general spirit of the treaty, notwithstanding "over-
sights" in its drafting. See L. BRINKHORST & H. SCHERMERS, supra note 15, at 221-28.
89. For the text of article 85, see note 63 supra.
90. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 25-27.
91. The use of article 85 might become a particularly likely possibility if the
Commission's recently proposed regulation (see notes 273-79 and accompanying text
infra) is ultimately rejected.
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plus the possibility of its use as the basis of a private action,92 this article
should not be discounted in any study of EEC merger controls.
Article 85, with its three subsections, is directed towards a broad
range of enterprise cooperation which threatens distortion of the desired
competition level. Article 85(1) provides the outside limits of the article's
applicability, prohibiting:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of un-
dertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .... 93
The content of this prohibition is quite broad in the abstract as it does
not specify either the nature of the agreement or the desired level of
competition. In the event that such a proscribed agreement is found, how-
ever, article 85(2) clearly mandates the automatic voidance of such ties.
94
Article 85 (3) also establishes an exemption which provides that the article's
proscriptions are inoperative under certain conditions.95 Generally sanc-
tioned is the agreement or practice which might ordinarily be prohibited
but "which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting benefit."'96 In order for an agreement to
fall within this exempting provision, it must also be shown that there is no
imposition of restrictions which are incompatible with competition objectives
or which present the possibility of eliminating substantially all competition.
97
The construction of the word "agreement," is critical as it would
appear that concentrations achieved through mergers might easily fall
within the language of article 85. Indeed, a working group of professors
(Working Party), assigned by the Commission to investigate the possible
applicability of article 85(1) to combinations other than cartels, concluded
that the article would be applicable to concentrations in which the enter-
prises remain legally distinct. 98  The requisite agreement could thus be
found in a merger achieved through pre-arranged transfer of a control-
ling stock interest, where the acquired undertaking maintained its legal
identity.9 9  While certain acquisitions, such as those achieved through
92. Such a case was brought in the French courts by St. Gobain Glass Company
to resist a takeover bid. Europe, Jan. 8, 1969, (neue serie), at 7 (German ed.).
93. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 2005, at 1631 (1973).
94. Id. The Commission asserts that this section would thus necessarily require
divestiture if article 85 were deemed applicable to merger agreements. Commission
Memorandum, supra note 31, at 26.
95. There had been some question as to whether article 85(3) provided an auto-
matic exemption from the operation of article 85(1), or merely granted a power to
the Commission to declare article 85(1) inapplicable where those conditions were met.
The latter has now been generally recognized. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW
292 (1973).
96. Article 85(3), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 2051 (1973).
97. Id.
98. The concensus of the Working Party is set forth in Commission Memorandum,
supra note 31, at 24. Note that this was the majority opinion. The minority would
deny the applicability of article 85 to concentrations. Id.
. 99. Id. This would still require that the purchase of shares be pursuant to an
agreement between the enterprises.
434 [VOL. 19
15
Smith: Control of Concentrations in the European Economic Community: Evo
Published by Villanova Univ rsity Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
FEBRUARY 1974]
stock purchases on an exchange, would still remain outside the range of
article 85,100 the Working Party's application of article 85 to merger
agreements would "include the most important cases." 10' Thus far, the
Commission has not agreed with this reading. The Commission requires
not only separate legal entities, but also economic independence between
the interacting firms before finding an illegal article 85 agreement. 10 2 By
focusing on economic independence, the Commission has strictly limited
the article's application to pure cartel arrangements, emasculating it as a
control on concentrations by insisting:
[I]t is not possible to apply Article 85 to agreements whose purpose
is the acquisition of total or partial ownership of enterprises or the
reorganization of the ownership of enterprises (merger, acquisition
of holdings, purchase of part of the assets) .103
Comparison of article 85 with the American experience under the
Sherman Act 0 4 demonstrates that such arrangements could be brought
within the article's conceptual framework. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States ... is declared to be illegal."' 1 5 Like article 85, section 1
seems tailored to cartel agreements rather than permanent changes in
ownership consummated through merger reorganizations. It is true that
the Sherman Act's specific inclusion of combinations achieved through
trust arrangements makes it somewhat more applicable to the close-knits,
and presents a stronger case for bringing mergers within its range.'0 6
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Commission concluded:
Article 85, paragraph 1, continues to be applicable if the agreement has as its
purpose no permanent change in the ownership but a coordination of the market
behavior of enterprises that remain economically independent.
Id. at 27.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), formerly ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
106. Section 1 was used to prevent mergers prior to the enactment of the Clayton
Act in 1914. United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922) ; United States
v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197 (1904). It was also used to dismember the oil and tobacco trusts. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
After the Clayton Act was passed, but prior to its amendment in 1950, section
1 of the Sherman Act was used to halt acquisitions effected through purchase of shares
rather than stock, immune from Clayton proscriptions. The Supreme Court in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), while absolving the nation's largest
steel producer of Sherman Act liability for the acquisition of the largest independent
steel fabricator on the west coast, established a test to be applied in determining the
validity of horizontal mergers under the Sherman Act:
If such acquisition results in or is aimed at unreasonable restraint, then the pur-
chase is forbidden by the Sherman Act. In determining what constitutes unrea-
sonable restraint . . . we look . . . to the percentage of business controlled, the
strength of the remaining competition, whether the action springs from business
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Yet, section 1 has been used against restraints of competition involving
concentrations of a non-trust variety, despite the fact that no traditional
cartel-type agreements were involved.' 0 7 For example, in United States
v. Union Pacific R.R.,108 the purchase of a controlling stock interest was
held to be an illegal combination under the Sherman Act. The term
"agreement" within article 85 might also be construed to include such
pre-arranged understandings to combine.
The Commission has stated, however, that if concentrations were to
be considered properly within the ambit of article 85, it would be forced
to utilize a double standard in the application of the article's provisions.10 9
Cartels have been viewed differently than have concentrations, even where
they have the same economic impact. The Commission has generally
favored concentrations in its implementation of avowed policies, and has,
for example, noted that, in the achievement of true economic integration,
loose associations are, in the great majority of cases, insufficient substi-
tutes for a truly efficient economic concentration."10 Since the Commission
utilizes different standards for its treatment of cartels and concentrations,
it finds the application of a single article to both inappropriate.", The
American experience demonstrates, however, that such broad control cer-
tainly can be founded on the same legislative formulation; judicial inter-
pretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act has resulted in its being applied
to both close-knit and loose-knit federations 112 through the use of a "rule
of reason" approach. While such a broad two-level approach has thus far
requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable development of the industry,
consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market.
Id. at 527.
Even after the Clayton Act was amended, the Supreme Court condemned the
consolidation of two large commercial banks as violative of section 1 due to the elimi-
nation of "significant competition" between them. United States v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
107. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
108. 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
109. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 25.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Section 1 has been applied most often to loose-knit combinations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (tying arrangement) ; Kiefer-
Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (concerted refusal
to deal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-
fixing agreement to stabilize market price); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets) ; Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 33 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir.
1941) (allocation of customers).
However, as noted previously, mergers have also been subject to section 1.
See Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The coverage of
section 1 is often co-extensive with that of section 7 of the Clayton Act. See United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). However, an actual restraint
must be proved under the Sherman Act, while the incipiency standard of the Clayton
Act requires only proof that a merger may substantially lessen competition. Compare
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act) with United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948)
(no violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act) ; but see United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
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been shunned by the Commission," 3 article 85 could support it. The
exemption of article 85(3) could be read as sanctioning the desired
mergers in "promoting economic progress" without lowering the overall
stringent proscriptions against harmful cartels."
4
The Commission has cited the nullity section of article 85(2), which
provides for automatic voidance of any prohibited agreements, in support
of its claim that the article is not applicable to the control of concentra-
tions.115 Since it is the merger agreement that would be annulled, it
would require dissolution or divestiture, arguably too harsh and inappro-
priate a remedy for all unlawful concentrations."' However, even assum-
ing that this concern is justified with respect to some mergers, the validity
of the point may be questioned when the merger action is in the form,
for example, of a consolidation, where the legal existence of the resulting
corporation can be distinguished from the agreement which created it.
A final argument which may be advanced against article 85's appli-
cability to concentrations is based upon comparison of the article with
certain provisions of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty,
forerunner to the Treaty of Rome.117 Article 65 of the European Coal
and Steel Community Treaty,"" which roughly parallels article 85, has
never been used in the control of concentrations, mainly because of the
extensive regulatory scheme provided by article 66,119 the companion to
article 65. Arguably, article 85 should be read similarly so as not to reach
mergers. 120 However, this reasoning is less than convincing. First, no
113. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW 282 (1973).
The Commission steadfastly has refused to recognize the "rule of reason"
standard in any article 85(1) application, pointing out that the article 85(3) excep-
tions amount to a specific limitation on any further "flexibility" of article 85. See,
e.g., Consten & Grundig v. EEC Commission, Case Nos. 56/64 and 58/64, [1961-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8046, at 7641 (1967).
114. This is especially true in light of the flexibility afforded by the recognized
legal effect of article 85(3). See note 95 supra.
However, the "rule of reason" approach to article 85 would probably be much
more supportable by a more "flexible" interpretation of 85(1) directly rather than a
reliance on the article 85(3) exceptions. This approach to article 85(1) has been
endorsed partly by the Court of Justice in other areas. R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF
REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW 185-87 (1967).
115. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 26.
116. The Commission argues that an "array of possibilities for intervention"
should be provided, rather than forced divestiture which might go beyond the restora-
tion of the status quo. Id. For a general review of divestiture problems in merger
cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act, see United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-33 (1961). See also C. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS - CASES AND COMMENTS 432-36 (3d ed. 1968).
117. While the Commission has never forcefully argued this point, it has been
suggested by a number of commentators as a possible explanation for the Commis-
sion's stance. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 275-76.
118. TREATIES, supra note 34, at 61-64.
119. TREATIES, supra note 34, at 64-69. Article 66(l)-(6) sets forth a rather
detailed scheme that subjects proposed mergers to the requirement of prior authoriza-
tion by the High Authority (Commission). Id. Article 66(7), in effect, prohibits an
enterprise's abuse of dominant position, and is similar to the proscriptions of article
86 of the Treaty of Rome. Id. at 68-69, 246-47. However, article 86 does not include
the mechanisms of article 66(1)-(6).
120. It has even been suggested that "[t]he omission from the Rome Treaty of a
provision corresponding to Article 66 could be interpreted as reflecting an intention
COMMENTS
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extensive regulatory scheme paralleling article 65 appears in the Treaty
of Rome, and thus there is less reason to declare article 85 preempted.
121
Second, this type of a contrario reasoning is not generally used in the
interpretation of Community law.
1 22
Thus, it is submitted that the decision not to apply article 85 is more
the result of administrative discretion than legal compulsion.1 2 3  The
strong policy favoring the promotion of certain types of intra-Community
concentration to encourage European economic integration and to promote
industrial competition with third countries has apparently discouraged a
comprehensive regulation of close-knits through use of article 85. This
stance could change with the advent of new attitudes towards concentra-
tions in general or towards other controls upon which the Commission
relies. It would be well to note that the Commission's newly proposed
regulation would subject most intended mergers to a rather extensive
system of Commission notification and control.124  This was motivated by
a recognition that "the degree of concentration is growing in such a manner
that the preservation of effective competition in the Common Market and
the objective set out in Article 3(f) could be jeopardized .... -125 If
this represents a changing Commission attitude, then it would be rea-
sonable to assume that if the proposal is ultimately rejected by the Council,
the Commission will, of necessity, rely on the present antitrust mechanism
to combat the new threat. As will be demonstrated, article 86 has certain
limitations as the basis for a comprehensive system. Although the Com-
mission has never given official recognition to the possibility, it may be
that article 85 could serve as the foundation for such a system in the future.
not to regulate mergers in any way." R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 275 (emphasis
added). This would, of course, preclude article 86's applicability as well since that
section does not provide the detailed scheme of article 66.
121. Article 66 makes explicit reference to mergers. TREATIES, supra note 34,
at 64. However, article 86 makes no such corresponding reference to such close-knit
combinations. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 2101 (1973).
122. This would be an inappropriate technique under the teleological interpreta-
tion of Community law. See note 88 supra.
123. In discussions with common market antitrust officials, it became clear to one
highly respected commentator that the inapplicability of article 85 to mergers was
due not to problems of construction but rather "a grave policy question." Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, International Aspects of Antitrust, 89th Cong., 2d Sess, pt. 1, at 367, 384
(1966) (statement by Mr. Rahl).
The Commission's stance regarding article 85 must also be considered in
light of its pro-concentration feelings at the time. It asserted:
A positive attitude toward concentrations has convinced the Commission as well
as industrial circles that legal or psychological obstacles to concentrations must
be eliminated.
Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 9. Much of the memorandum particularly
pointed out the need for concentration of small and medium-size enterprises. Id. at
10-11. Removal of psychological barriers might have been one compelling reason for
the Commission's refusal to subject those enterprises to possible article 85 violations.
This attitude may be changing however.
124. Proposal For a Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 2 CCH COMM. MET. REP. I 9586, at 9300-04 (1973).
125. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9302.
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IV. ARTICLE 86126
Like article 85, article 86 makes no specific mention of mergers or
concentrations, but, unlike article 85, this has not quelled Commission
enthusiasm for its use as an anti-merger tool.127 This section shall deal
with the theoretical foundation for its applicability, which was ultimately
tested in Continental Can.
128
The operative portion of article 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position with-
in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited
as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect
trade between Member States.
129
The provision additionally provides four illustrations of abuse: imposition
of unfair trading terms; limitation of production, markets, or technical
development; discrimination among competing parties; and creation of
tying arrangements. 30 The language of the article, then, embraces a
behavioral, as opposed to structural, approach; it is not a dominant posi-
tion that is to be regulated, but rather the abuse of that position which is
to be subject to control. Article 86 does not appear to be concerned with
mere achievement of market power, and regulation would seem to be im-
posed for acts independent of the firm's growth to market dominance.
If this is so, the act of enterprise expansion through non-predatory merger
would appear to be beyond the article's reach.
American law, on the other hand, is aimed more at the achievement
or maintenance of economic power itself.131 This policy is directed at the
preservation of competition through the self-regulating mechanism of the
market, rather than through direct control of the evils sought to be pre-
vented. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes the monopolization
126. The text of article 86 is set forth in note 64 supra.
127. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 27-28; FrST COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 19, at 78-81; SECOND COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-28.
128. See notes 226-46 and accompanying text infra.
129. 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. f 2101 (1973).
130. These examples are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. A.
DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 168
(1968). However, as all of the examples appear to involve behavioral as opposed
to structural matters, they often have been read as a limitation on the applicability
of article 86 to purely structural considerations. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 247.
But see the Court of Justice's interpretation in Continental Can, notes 229-32 and
accompanying text infra.
131. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
So it is that monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may
itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains
unexercised. For § 2 of the [Sherman] Act is aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition
or retention of effective market control.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
Especially under the prevailing structure theory of monopolization, the
existence of abuse is logically unnecessary and irrelevant, for the defendant's conduct
is immaterial. G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 27, at 166; Rostow, Monopoly Under
The Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. Rxv. 745, 772 (1949). However,
proof of genuine abuse might constitute an a fortiori violation of section 2 under the
structure theory. G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 27, at 166 n.6. 20
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of interstate trade, may be violated even without a showing that market
power is coupled with unfair restraints of trade or predatory practices.
82
Although a concept of abuse historically has been associated with section
2, it was directed towards means used to achieve and hold the monopoly
power rather than to acts involving exploitation of a controlled market.188
Even the need for this showing was de-emphasized in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) .134 Judge Hand, confronted with
monopoly power achieved through Alcoa's overwhelming share of the in-
dustry, held that possession of monopoly power was enough to support a
finding of illegal monopolization, unless it was determined that the market
share of the enterprise had been "thrust upon it."1 38 Thus, for all practical
purposes, illegal monopolization was primarily a structural concept; it
could be held to exist even without a showing of active exploitation of
that position. However, in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,8 6
the court, in taking the position that monopoly power was tantamount to
illegal monopolization unless such power was attributable to superior skill
or efficiency, 8 7 evidenced a partial retreat from Judge Hand's test and a
widening of excusable causes in the achievement of the market power.
But it was still true that Sherman Act monopolization did not require the
existence of abusive tactics in exploiting the monopoly position. This
dichotomy between the Sherman Act and article 86 led a number of
commentators to conclude that the "European approach is antagonistic
to a true antitrust philosophy."'18 The Commission disagreed,'8 9 and,
with the hindsight afforded by Continental Can, the validity of the Com-
mission's position can be seen. Full appreciation of article 86's meta-
morphosis into an effective merger control device necessitates analysis of
its two fundamental operative terms: "dominant position" and "abuse.'
140
132. The Supreme Court has stated:
Monopoly power is not condemned by the Act only when it was unlawfully
obtained. The mere existence of the power to monopolize, together with the
purpose or intent to do so, constitutes an evil at which the Act is aimed.
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 130 (1948). Accord:
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) ; United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 305 (1948).
133. See note 27 supra.
134. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
135. Id. at 429.
136. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
This case is often cited by European commentators as a link between section 2 of the
Sherman Act and article 86. See text accompanying notes 188-92 infra.
137. The court would require that control "rest solely in its original constitution,
its ability, its research, or its economics of scale." Id. at 344.
138. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 297.
139. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 30.
140. While article 86 will be deemed to contain only these two primary operative
features for purposes of this analysis, other commentators have considered article 86"an equation with three unknowns :" dominant position, substantial part of the common
market, and abuse. Samkalden & Druker, Legal Problems Relating To Article 86 of
The Rome Treaty, 3 CoMm. MKT. L. REv. 158, 169 (1965). The instant analysis com-
bines the first two features in discussion concerning market dominance.
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Interpretation of these terms, especially in comparison with the terms of
the Sherman Act, highlights the significance of the Court of Justice's hold-
ing in Continental Can.
A. Dominant position
The definition of market domination for EEC purposes has itself
been couched in behavioral rather than structural terms. One of the
earliest proposals concerning the concept was advanced by the Working
Party charged with preliminary analysis of article 86.141 Their suggested
definition turned on whether the enterprise was "able to exert a major
influence on the decisions of other economic entities by means of an in-
dependent strategy, so that no practicable or sufficiently effective competi-
tion can arise or be maintained on that market.' 42 This definition, which
regarded power to achieve undesirable results as market dominance, was
not viewed favorably by commentators or by the Commission. For ex-
ample, Rene Joliet suggested the resulting tautology where "competition
is defined in terms of performance and dominant position is considered
as the power to achieve economic results different from those which would
indicate a state of effective competition."' 43 So viewed, there is no real
starting point in the Working Party's formulation; the terms "dominant
position" and "competition" refer to each other without reference to market
structure. 44 Since the source of the power of the dominant firm lies in the
structure of the market, Joliet has suggested that it is essential to refer
to the pressures or lack of pressures of the industry structure in de-
fining dominance. 145
The concept of monopoly power under the Sherman Act is focused
more upon structural considerations. The basic definition of monopoly
power, set forth in American Tobacco v. United States146 as "the power
to combat prices or exclude competition,"' 47 contains wording somewhat
similar to that of the initial article 86 definition of market dominance.
However, since the concept of competition in the American sense is not
so much founded on tests of performance, the existence of monopoly
power may be inferred irrespective of whether an enterprise has the
strength "to achieve undesirable results." Thus, mere predominance of
the business done in a relevant market was enough to demonstrate
monopoly power in United States v. Grinnell Corp. 48 Other factors in
141. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 24.
142. Id.
143. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 233.
144. Competition was regarded by the Working Party to exist where:
enterprises do not limit sales or production in an extreme or artificial manner, if
they meet demand in a satisfactory manner, and if they allow the purchasers of
their products a fair share of the profit resulting from technical and economic
progress.
Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 24.
145. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 234.
146. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
147. Id. at 811.
148. 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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the structural analysis include increase or decrease of a defendant's share
of the market,140 the ease of market entry by newcomers, 1 0 and the effect
of price changes on consumer behavior.' 5 '
The Commission itself has emphasized the relative unimportance of
the American-type structural analysis. While noting in particular a dis-
tinction between monopoly and market dominance,'152 it observed that:
"[m]arket domination cannot be defined solely in terms of the market
share of an enterprise or of other quantitative elements of a particular
market structure.' ' 53  It particularly emphasized the insignificance of
market share as a determinative factor by specifically asserting that a
firm might hold a position of dominance even if its own share of the
market is relatively small.1 4 The Commission has set forth a strikingly
broad standard, stating that market dominance:
is primarily a matter of economic potency, or its ability to exert on
the operation of the market an influence that is substantial and also in
principle foreseeable for the dominant enterprise. 155
The flexibility of the Commission's definition comports with the
EEC's competition policy. Reflected in its formulation are many of those
extralegal considerations which the Commission seeks to inject into its
analysis. For example, the desire to reduce the influence of large third-
nation enterprises would be facilitated by the broad standard of "economic
potency" which would allow the Commission to reach firms with powerful
outside backing even where the market share is otherwise insignificant. 156
The Commission can thus cut through burdensome market analyses and
focus on the economic realities. Furthermore, this definition, which may
reflect actual as well as potential enterprise activity, is quite conducive
to the behavioral orientation of article 86.
149. While "share of the market" is a significant factor, it can be difficult to
determine what proportions of market control are legal. G. HALE & R. HALE, supra
note 27, at 120. Monopoly power has been found under section 2 of the Sherman
Act where market share has been as low as 20 per cent. United States v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255, 270 (1920).
150. Potential competition from producers of presently non-competitive articles
may be taken into consideration in weighing the effect of acquisition of assets. United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948). See also United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 893 (D.N.J. 1949) ; United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), rev'd 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
151. United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-96 (1956).
152. A monopolistic situation is regarded by the Commission as a possible abuse
within the meaning of article 86. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 30.
As such, monopoly power would be clearly treated on a separate level from mere
market dominance.
153. Id. at 28.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. "Economic potency" would thus seem to include such considerations of large
outside financial resources. This would comport with certain extralegal considera-
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The Commission's formulation, while escaping the previously men-
tioned tautology, 5 7 still does not circumvent the need for some structural
analysis.15 8 Even the term "economic potency" can only be measured
against the background of a relevant geographic or economic market. 59
First, the finding of a limited submarket significantly enhances the chances
of finding market domination; a firm may have sufficient economic potency
in a relatively small market while being subjected to intensive market
pressure on a broader scale.' 10 Second, article 86's explicit reference to
market domination measured against "a substantial part of"'161 the com-
mon market makes it clear that geographical submarkets may be relevant
in the determination of a dominant position. This need for structural analy-
sis will become further evident in the discussion of Continental Can 6 2
the first real Court of Justice review of the Commission's formulation.
In the final analysis, the determination of a relevant geographic market
will probably entail structural determination'1 3 balanced by policy con-
siderations. The EEC's general encouragement of continental markets so
as to promote trans-national integration makes it likely that the ultimate
market boundaries will be somewhat wider than that of their American
counterparts. The EEC's trans-national orientation led various commen-
tators to conclude that it would be impossible to confine a relevant market
to the geographical boundaries of a single member state.0 4 That belief,
however, was laid to rest by the limited market finding in Continental
Can,'16 5 which itself may be said to indicate the acceptance of a structural
analysis, although that finding may also be explained by the fact that the
case involved a third nation enterprise seeking expansion, and that in
157. The definitional formulation is not based upon the existence or non-existence
of "competition" as was the standard proposed by the Working Party. See text
accompanying note 142 supra.
158. Even the Commission recognizes that quantitative elements of market struc-
ture are of some significance. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 28.
159. This is explicitly recognized by the Commission. Commission Memorandum,
supra note 31, at 29.
160. Id.
161. The determination of this would be essentially based upon the determination
of a relevant market. For a general review of the possible territorial and material
delineations, see Samkalden & Druker, supra note 140, at 169-72. However, the factors
in this determination are still unclear. See notes 169-71 and accompanying text infra.
For the Court of Justice's analysis in Continental Can, see notes 251-56 and accom-
panying text infra.
162. The Commission's lack of regard for such structural considerations was
largely responsible for its failure to prove its case. See notes 249-58 and accompany-
ing text infra.
163. For review of the American process, see G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 27,
at 113-19.
164. McLachlan & Swann have stated that "the possibility of the 'substantial part'
of the Common Market referring to one Member State only would appear to be
excluded." McLachlen & Swann, Competition Policy in the Common Market,
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, March, 1963, cited by Roberts, The Concept of the Dominant
Firm, 8 CARTEL 142, 150-51 (1963). However, the Commission, addressing itself to
this question, stated the contrary. EEC, ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE EEC TREATY
AND THE RELEVANT REGULATIONS: MANUAL FOR FIRMS 5 (1962).
165. See note 249 infra.
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such a situation the countervailing policy against outside dominance can
be considered as a justification for the more restrictive policy.
Undoubtedly, a relevant product market also enters into the final
determination of dominant position,'" and might well be established
along the lines of the test followed in United States v. E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. :167
Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on
how different from one another are the offered commodities in char-
acter or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one commodity
for another.16
8
This examination, in turn, would entail an analysis of such economic
factors as cross-elasticity of demand 169 and ease of entry by alternative
suppliers.7 0 Here again, extralegal considerations could conceivably come
into play.' 71 For example, the desire to secure a competitive position for
the European firms vis-it-vis third nation enterprises might dictate that
narrower product market boundaries be drawn where the particular in-
dustry is marked by high entry costs which normally give financially
powerful outside firms a competitive advantage.
B. Abuse
Since it is the misuse of a dominant position that is illegal rather
than the achievement of dominant status alone, 72 it is not surprising
that the applicability of article 86 turns primarily upon the construction
of the term "abuse." Clearly the term would include behavior on the part
of the dominant enterprise that involves a form of market exploitation.
The article itself set forth illustrative, though not exhaustive, examples of
such behavior which is deemed to be abusive - imposition of unfair trad-
ing terms; limitation of production, market, or technical development;
166. Obviously, the relative competitive position of an enterprise may appear
greater when viewed in relationship to products in a "single market" than when
viewed as an absolute. A "single market" includes all goods which are used for the
purpose of meeting a certain need or accomplishing a certain purpose and which can
therefore be substituted for one another. A. DERINGER, supra note 130, at 160.
167. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The use of this "reasonable interchangeability test" as
the basis for finding the relevant product market has been suggested by some foreign
commentators. J. MICHAEL, DIE BEURTEILUNG VON UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMEN-
SCHLuSSEN NACM ART. 86 EWG-VERTAG IM LICHTE DER AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT-
SPRECHUNG 170 (1970) (dissertation on file at the Commission library in Luxembourg).
168. 351 U.S. at 394. See Note, The Market: A Concept in Anti-Trust, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 580 (1954)
169. 351 U.S. at 393. The market concept must be narrowed so that only like
products with a considerable cross-elasticity of demand will be included in a particular
market. See Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
170. This factor was stressed by the Court of Justice when striking down the
Commission's determination of a relevant product market in Continental Can. See
text accompanying notes 252-56 infra.
171. The Court of Justice has not yet articulated a precise structural standard
to be used in the determination of the relevant market. It would thus appear that many
of these extralegal factors could be taken into consideration.
172. Article 86 proscribes "any abuse . . . of a dominant position ... " 1 CCH
CoMm. MKT. REP. 1 2101 (1973).
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discrimination among competing parties; and creation of tying arrange-
mentsY as Not so clear, however, is whether article 86 would be able to
reach more than behavior related to direct market exploitation, whether
it could, for instance, be applied to activity consisting of purely structural
market extension by a dominant firm which was unaccompanied by eco-
nomic exploitation. As shall be demonstrated, the resolution of that
problem bears directly upon the applicability of article 86 to mergers and,
until the clarification provided by Continental Can, a wide split developed
in regard to the interpretation.
Joliet 1 74 expressed the first and more traditional theory of abuse
applicable to article 86:
The test of legality is not the interference with other firms' freedom
to compete and the use of "exclusionary" practices to achieve and
hold power, but rather whether there is monopolistic exploitation
of the market however market domination has been achieved and
maintained.175
The monopolistic exploitation referred to in this narrow interpretation
presumably only includes, besides the article 86 examples, any coercive
or predatory conduct which restricts economic freedoms. Indeed, early
application of the article was limited to preventing a dominant firm from
taking an unjust advantage of its market position. In the first article 86
action,"76 for example, the Commission found such abusive behavior on
the part of GEMA 7 7 a society dealing with authors' rights with regard
to musical works. Having a monopoly on the German market through
its holdings of musical copyrights, GEMA was found to have abused
that position through the imposition of unfair tying arrangements as well
as through discriminatory behavior against non-Germans. Since each
173. For the text of article 86, see note 64 supra.
One recent example of abusive behavior which is not specifically mentioned
in article 86(b) concerned the American company, Commercial Solvents Corporation
(CSC), and its Italian subsidiary, Institute Chemioterapico Italiano (ICI), CSC,
holding the world monopoly on the manufacture of materials necessary for the pro-
duction of a necessary drug, refused to supply a competitor with the necessary in-
gredients. The Commission found that this had the effect of eliminating a substantial
competitor and, since it was without commercial justification, must be considered
abusive. CSC and ICI not only were fined substantially, but were also forced to supply
its competitor with the ingredients, thereby extending the remedies previously em-
ployed. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9543 (1973). The Court of Justice recently
rejected the appeal by CSC and ICI, affirming the principle that the refusal to sell
by a de facto monopoly, which tends to eliminate competition, is an abuse of a domi-
nant position. ICI and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Court of Justice
Case Nos. 6, 7/73, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209 (1974).
174. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 250-51.
175. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). Joliet considered the goal of the Rome Treaty,
and specifically that of article 86, to be "to preserve competitive processes but to
ensure that market domination is not actually exploited to the detriment of utilizers,
whatever tactics have been used against competitors." Id. at 293.
176. Commission Decision of June 2, 1971, Official Journal [hereinafter O.J.]
No. L134, June 20, 1971, at 15. For a summary, see 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2111.37 (1973).
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form of abuse related to unfair exploitation - conduct sharply distinct
from the achievement or maintenance of a dominant position - it was
possible to prohibit the abuse without violating the confirmed right to
achieve market dominance. This distinction is not so clear, however,
where the alleged abusive behavior consists of market extension1 78 rather
than market exploitation. It is at this point that the narrow reading be-
comes significant, since market extension, being more structural than
behavioral in nature, 17 9 would not appear to fit this traditional notion of
abuse. Joliet's refusal to include such action within the proscriptions of
article 86 is made clear by his specific refusal to consider the use of exclu-
sionary practices to achieve and hold market power as an element of the
article's test of abuse.'8 0
Other commentators' 8 ' as well as the Commission'8 2 espouse a
second theory of abuse which would permit market extension to be
brought within article 86's proscription. The rationale for this expanded
reading roughly parallels the American treatment of single firm monopo-
lization under section 2 of the Sherman Act as interpreted in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.18 3 United Shoe, having developed
overwhelming strength in the shoe machinery market, distributed its
equipment through a network of long-term leases, which it applied "so as
to strengthen [its] power to exclude competition.'. 8 4 With some market
power traceable to the exclusionary feature of the lease-only policy of the
company, illegal monopolization was found on the ground that the policy
would "affect potential competition.' 8 5  Likewise, it was this concern
with effect upon potential competition that formed the basis of the theory
that article 86 was to be broadly read to reach market extension. Pro-
ponents of this second theory would include market expansion as an
abusive behavior, recognizing the damaging eventualities brought about
through the consequent reduction of potential competition. As such, even
absent a present abusive exploitation of the market position, a firm could
be guilty of illegal article 86 abuse through a mere structural extension of
its market power. This proscribed market expansion would, however,
presumably include a much greater degree of market power than mere
dominance, since a dominant position alone is not proscribed.
The inclusion of market expansion within the reach of article 86, in
turn, bears directly on its applicability to mergers which effect the further
growth of an already dominant firm. After all, by increasing market
178, Market extension, as used in this context, refers to external growth by means
of acquisition as opposed to purely internal expansion.
179. Such action would appear to merely further entrench the enterprise's dominant
market position rather than to present any sort of abusive behavior in the traditional
sense of direct market exploitation.
180. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 292-93.
181. See notes 188-98 and accompanying text infra.
182. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 30.
183. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
184. Id. at 343.
185. Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted).
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domination, the firm would enjoy the benefit of excluding a potential
competitor. The merger, as an exclusionary practice within the meaning
of United Shoe, could thus be deemed abusive behavior' 86 even though it
did not involve direct market exploitation. 8 7 Drawing on the American
Sherman Act experience, proponents of the second theory have thus
argued strenuously for an interpretation of article 86 that includes merger
activity as abusive behavior. 88  Ernst-Joachim Mestmficker,'189 for ex-
ample, has found that whereas maintenance of power by a dominant
enterprise is the most important task of its market strategy, the most
typical instances of abuse lie in the dominant enterprise's defense and
extension of its market power.' 9" He cites United Shoe to show this
steady preoccupation with the existence and activity of present and poten-
tial competitors,' 91 and notes that, above all, enterprise concentration may
hamper the development of the common market by denying competitors
access to the market dominated. 192 Thus, in 1966, he declared: "From
that it follows: he who controls market entry, dominates the market; if he
forecloses entry by others, he abuses his dominant position."' 9 3 This
position provides the necessary conceptual foundation for the applicability
of article 86 to the merger activity of an already dominant firm. If that
firm were to expand its influence through acquisitions so that all effective
competition were essentially eliminated,' it would be deemed abusive within
the meaning of article 86. This would, of course, inject a purely structural
element into the meaning of abuse 94 and, while under this approach article
186. It should be noted that this abuse would be found even where no predatory
practices were employed in achieving this exclusion of competitors.
187. This theory would find abusive behavior through market extension, even
where that growth was independent of the original market dominance. See notes
259-61 and accompanying text infra. As such, this approach would go even farther
than United Shoe. See note 357 and accompanying text infra.
188. Many commentators dealt with this second theory after the Commission
brought its original action against Continental Can in 1970. See, e.g., J. MICHAEL,
supra note 167, at 166-234; Markert, Marktmacht und ihre Kontrolle Monopole und
Zusammenschliisse, in FRAGEN DES EUROP.ISCHEN KARTELLRECHTs 71, 77-79 (1970);
Axster, Art. 86 EWG-Vertrag als Instrument der Fusionskontrolle? 11 & 12 WIRT-
SCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 758, 763 (1971); Scheufele, "Beherrschende Stellung"
und ihre "miss brduchliche Ausnutzung" im EWG-Kartellrecht, 10 AuSSENWIRT-
SCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBs-BERATERS 457, 468-70 (1971).
189. Mestmicker was one of the earliest proponents of this principle. Mestmicker,
Die Beurteilung von Unternehmenszusammenschliissen nach Artikel 86 des Vertrages
iiber die Europiiische Wirtschaftgemeinschaft, in PROBLEME DES EuRoPAISCHEN
RECHTs 322-54 (1966) [hereinafter cited Mestmficker 1966]. He published some of
those ideas in English seven years later. Mestmaker, Concentration and Competition
in the EEC, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615-47 (1973), 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 36-63
(1973) [hereinafter cited Mestmicker 1973].
190. Mestmicker 1973, supra note 189, at 645.
191. Id. at 644.
192. Mestmdcker 1966, supra note 189, at 333.
193. Id. at 333-34 (writer's translation). The original text reads:
Daraus folgt: Wer fiber den Zugang zum Markt entscheidet, beherrscht den
Markt; wer andere vom Zugang zum Markt ausschliesst, niitzt seine beherrschende
Stellung missbriuchlich aus.
194. Although acquisition constitutes activity on the part of the dominant firm,
it is structurally oriented. As such, that behavior would be similar to the activity
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86 would still permit the existence of a dominant enterprise on the market,
any further growth would be deemed abusive if it had the prohibited effect
of eliminating competition. Although this dual-level structural standard
would appear to raise conceptual difficulties, 195 Mestmaicker was uncon-
cerned, stating: "The fact that article 86 does not prevent the formation
of dominant firms does not preclude treating the further strengthening of
this dominance as an abuse of power."' 96 Mestmiicker did not view
article 86 as necessarily neutral vis-A-vis economic power just because
market dominance itself is immune from attack. Since market power may
increase beyond the point of mere dominance, he considered that controls
may be imposed which prevent the further restriction of competition.1 9 7
When a merger affords the dominant enterprise this proscribed propor-
tion of control, the acquisition should be deemed abusive.1 98
The Commission, long a proponent of this second theory, explicitly
recognized the harmful effects resulting from further growth of an already
dominant firm.199 Noting that such activity is just as dangerous as the
practices described in article 86(b),200 the Commission explained:
[A] monopolistic situation removes incentives toward technical prog-
ress. It often leads to a limitation of production, with the aim of reap-
ing maximum profits, through prices that are higher than they would
be on a market with oligopolistic competition .... 201
This position was bothersome to the proponents of the first theory
since it viewed competition from more of a structural angle than they
thought to be proper. Those behaviorists often cited the non-structurally
oriented examples of article 86(b) as a limitation on the type of conduct
which could be proscribed through the article.20 2 The apparent two-level
market dominance which was thought to be injected into article 86 also
troubled adherents of the first theory. 203 The Commission, in mentioning
195. See notes 203-07 and accompanying text infra.
196. Mestmicker 1966, supra note 189, at 330 (writer's translation). The original
text reads:
Die Tatsache, dass Artikel 86 der Entstehung beherrschender Unternehmen nicht
unmittelbar entgegenwirkt, schliesst aber nicht aus, die weitere Steigerung der
Marktmacht als missbriiuchliche Ausnutzung zu beurteilen.
197. Id., Mestmicker 1973, supra note 189, at 642. This recognizes that market
power is not to be regarded as an absolute but, rather is capable of considerable
gradation and change. Id.
198. It would, as such, be in violation of the principles set forth in article 3(f)
calling for undistorted competition. Mestmiicker 1966, supra note 189, at 330.
199. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 30.
200. Id. Article 86(b) is set forth in note 64 supra.
201. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 30.
202. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 247.
203. Joliet stated:
If there is only a difference of degree between market domination and the posi-
tion described as monopolistic by the Commission, and if both situations carry
with them the same dangers, one must wonder how a differential treatment can
be justified.
Id. at 292, citing Hefermehl, Mark tbeherrschende Unternehmen und Zusammen-
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monopolistic situations, appeared to be distinguishing monopoly from mere
market dominance. 20 4 Objections were based on the contention that no
such dual plateau was intended by the article,20 5 and, that even if it were,
the precise definitional nature of the second level was unknown.20 6 That
problem is compounded by the fact that dominant position itself is argu-
ably only a muddled concept.2° 7
In spite of the skepticism with which the Commission's principle was
received, it reaffirmed that position in 1972, stating that "subject to a
contrary interpretation by the Court of Justice, the Commission ... applies
article 86 of the EEC Treaty to concentrations of enterprises holding a
dominant position where they are detrimental to consumers. ' 20 8 That
the Commission meant to include growth-through-merger within the cate-
gory of conduct "detrimental to consumers" became quite clear when it
moved against Continental Can's contemplated expansion in 1970. The
Commission's action provided the basis for the eventual Court review
of its position.
C. The Commission Applies its Principle
20 9
Continental Can Co., Inc., of New York (Continental), a major in-
ternational producer of metal containers and other packaging materials
(as well as machinery for manufacturing and utilizing containers), ac-
quired control over Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke (SLW), a German-based
company which was a large manufacturer of light metal containers and
sealing machines. Continental also had a Dutch licensee, 210 Thomassen
& Drijver-Verblifa N.V. (TDV), which produced metal containers and
other packaging products. In order to effect a contemplated extension of
its activity and influence in Europe, Continental, in February 1970, con-
summated an agreement with TDV, under which Continental would set
up a holding company in Delaware (U.S.A.), called Europemballage
Corp., and transfer to it Continental's entire interest in SLW. Continental
would then have Europemballage offer TDV shareholders an adequate
amount for their stock while the TDV management would encourage their
shareholders to sell. This agreement was carried out, resulting in Europem-
ballage achieving a 91 per cent interest in TDV by April 8, 1970.
204. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 28.
205. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 291.
206. This remains true even after the Continental Can decision. See notes 264-67
and accompanying text infra.
207. Id.
208. Commission's Special Report on Competition Policy [1970-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 11 9507, at 9118.
209. The facts set forth are a summary of those relied upon by the Court of
Justice in the subsequent appeal. 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. q 8171, at 8281-83 (1973).
210. For a further description of Continental Can's European licensing arrange-
ments, see Vanderwicken, Continental Can's Intercontinental Tribulations, FORTUNE,
Aug., 1973, at 74.
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The Commission, promptly initiated proceedings under article 3 of
regulation 17211 against Continental and Europemballage. In its formal
decision,212 handed down December 9, 1971, the Commission found that
Continental held, through SLW, a dominant position in a substantial part
of the common market (Germany) - specifically in the market for certain
light containers and metal lids for glass jars.213 The acquisition of TDV
in the Netherlands, Continental's one-time competitor, was found to have
had the effect of strengthening its dominant position so as to virtually
eliminate competition.214 Since the action eliminated competition across a
national frontier, 215 the Commission held that there had been an abuse
within the meaning of article 86.21' The Commission consequently decided
that Continental had to terminate that abuse and submit proposals for
complying with its order before July 1, 1972.217 Continental, contending
that the Commission had incorrectly applied article 86, refused to comply
and brought suit in the Court of Justice to annul the Commission's de-
cision. The Court reached a decision which examined the merits of the
Commission's theory on February 21, 1973.218
V. Continental Can: LOSING THE BATTLE, BUT
WINNING THE WAR
The Commission was reversed on the facts, but affirmed in principle.
Viewing Continental Can merely as a test case, 219 the Commission ex-
pressed satisfaction with the power which was bestowed upon it by the
Court's favorable reaction to its controversial interpretation. 22 0 However,
while the Commission's newly found powers appeared broad, they re-
mained ill-defined, so that the value of the Continental Can interpretation
as the basis of a systematic and comprehensive regulatory scheme can
211. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 2421 (1971).
212. Commission Decision of Dec. 9, 1971, O.J. No. L7, Jan. 8, 1972, at 25; Comm.
Mkt. L.R., Restrictive Practices Supplement No. 2, Mar., 1972, at Dll-35 [subsequent
cites will be to this source].
213. Restrictive Practices, supra note 212, at D27, D31, Continental Can was
adjudged to have obtained a dominant position in Germany in the market of light
containers for preserved meat products. It held, through SLW, a 70 to 80 per cent
share of the market as to "open top" tins. Id. at D27. A dominant position in the
market of light containers for preserved fish products similarly was found on the
basis of an 80 to 90 per cent market share. Id. at D28.
214. Id. at D34.
215. Article 86 requires that trade between member states be affected before a
finding of illegal activity. 1 CCH COMM. MXT. REP. ff 2101 (1973).
216. Restrictive Practices, supra note 212, at D31-34.
217. Id. at D35.
218. Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, Court of Justice Case
No. 6/72, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8171, at 8280-8313 (1973).
219. The Commission Is Satisfied With the Interpretation of Article 86 EEC
Given by the Court of Justice, Europe, Feb. 23, 1973, No. 1229 (new series), at 3
(English ed.).
220. While there are no strict rules of stare decisis, the Court of Justice is quite
reluctant to go against its own precedents. See L. BRINKHORST & H. ScHERM-.s,
supra note 15, at 221. The precedential power is further enhanced in this case by the
finality of the principles in the Court's pronouncements.
450 [VOL. 19
31
Smith: Control of Concentrations in the European Economic Community: Evo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
FEBRUARY 1974]
be judged only in reference to the quantum of proof which the Court of
Justice would have required to sustain the Commission.
A. Affirmed in principle
Since the alleged abuse was committed by Europemballage, a sub-
sidiary of Continental which had its own legal personality, the Court of
Justice, after disposing of a number of peripheral issues, 22' dealt with the
competence of the Commission to issue its order against Continental.222
The fact that Europemballage was answerable for the alleged wrong was
not questioned. Continental argued, however, that, as a separate legal
entity, it could not be deemed responsible for Europemballage's conduct.
223
The Court found that the action of a subsidiary could be imputed to the
parent, especially where the facts indicated that Europemballage had acted
on direct orders from Continental.2 24 Apparently, the Court, was willing
to disregard separate legal personalities and find one juridical unit among
companies that form a single economic whole.
22 5
The Court then turned to the central issue of whether the word "abuse"
in article 86 was to be limited to acts which amount to direct and detri-
mental anti-competitive behavior or whether it could include acts which
accomplished structural alterations in the marketplace. 226 In accepting
the latter interpretation, the Court held that abusive conduct could be
present where the dominant enterprise strengthened its position "to the
point where the degree of dominance achieved substantially hampers
competition, so that only enterprises which in their market conduct are
dependent on the dominant enterprise would remain on the market."22 7
The Court then suggested that the Commission would be required to show
that competition was so substantially affected that remaining competitors
could no longer provide "a sufficient counterbalance." 228
In arriving at its holding, the Court merely paid lip service to the
language of article 86. Citing the four examples of abusive behavior set
forth within the article, the Court properly determined that the list was
not exhaustive. 229 But, it went on to state that two of the examples -
221. The Court rejected Continental's contention that there was a violation of due
process because it did not have an adequate opportunity to state its views. 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 8171, at 8297. Further rejected was a claim that the Commis-
sion's decision was deficient in that it did not adequately state the reasons for its
holding. Id. at 8297-98. For other procedural matters, see id. at 8298.
222. Id. at 8298.
223. For Continental Can Co.'s arguments relating to this matter, see id. at 8284-85.
224. Id. at 8298. The Court implicitly indicated, however, that the activity might
be imputed even where such direct orders were not shown. Id.
225. This disregard of the corporate entity, which would preclude the formation
of a subsidiary corporation for the purpose of absorbing a third corporation, is also
recognized in American antitrust law. See 1 H. TOULMIN, ANTI-TRUST LAWS
15.25 (1973).
226. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. RE. 8171, at 8299.
227. Id. at 8300.
228. Id. at 8301.
229. Id. at 8300.
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discriminatory dealings and tying agreements - demonstrated that not
only immediately detrimental activity was within the scope of the article
but also practices which involved potential harm to consumers through
inherently structural changes of actual competition.280 Apparently, the
Court found this to be a basis for extending the reach of article 86 to
extension of market power.28 ' As such, both the Court's premise and its
conclusion would appear to be questionable.282
The Court sacrificed a literal reading to the traditional European ap-
proach of a teleological interpretation,2 8 and stressed the underlying rules
and objectives of the Treaty as the determinative factors in its decision.2 4
The policy which formed the foundation of the decision was based upon
article 3(f), which calls for the establishment of a system ensuring undis-
torted competition.28 5 The Court deemed the competition articles to con-
tain only general provisions enacted to achieve the stated objectives.28
Literal flaws were not to be permitted to interfere with the overall Treaty
effectiveness.
2 7
The Court of Justice continued this analysis, expounding a theory
very similar to that of Mestmdicker. 288 Articles 85 and 86 were viewed
as pursuing the objective of*effective competition at two levels - article
85 dealing with concerted practices, and article 86 concerning unilateral
action taken by one or more enterprises.28 9 Although the articles applied
at separate levels, the Court would not, in the absence of an express con-
trary provision, assume that the Treaty contemplated a difference in the
legal treatment between the two.240 Otherwise, results which article 85
prohibited, when accomplished through simple agreement of enterprises,
might be permitted by article 86 if achieved through a merger associa-
tion.241 That "would open up in the competition law as a whole a breach
that could jeopardize the proper functioning of the Common Market." 242
230. Id. The Court of Justice mentioned the last two examples listed in article
86(b) with particularity. Discriminatory behavior and tying arrangements were cited
to show that article 86:
... relates not only to practices that are likely to cause an immediate detriment for
consumers, but also to practices which, because of their effect on the structure of




232. Assuming that the two cited examples properly support the proposition that
abusive behavior may include structural considerations, it is nevertheless true that
each listed example relates to activity that has an unfair and immediate effect upon
consumers. Since this is not the case where a purely structural modification through
market extension is involved, an obvious distinction remains.
233. See note 88 supra.
234. 2 CCH COMM. MXT. RE:P. 8171, at 8299-8300.
235. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
236. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8171, at 8300.
237. Id. at 8299-8300.
238. See notes 188-98 and accompanying text supra.
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The Court specifically expressed the concern that a contrary reading of
article 86 would allow firms to avoid the article 85 proscriptions against
market division through the use of merger-produced concentrations. 24
Under the Court's analysis, the principle of article 85 (3) (b) ,244 which seeks
to avoid elimination of competition with respect to a "substantial part" of
the products in question should be equally applicable to article 86.245 Thus,
merger activity should not escape the system contemplated by the Treaty's
authors as manifested by article 85.246
A preliminary criticism of the Court's reasoning is that it appears to
disregard the long-established principle that concentrations generally are
viewed more favorably than cartels in effecting overall Community policy.247
By viewing both in an equally harsh light, the Court is approaching com-
petition policy in a vacuum - certainly not the intent of the authors of
the Treaty of Rome.
2 48
B. Reversed on facts
Simply stated, the Commission failed to prove its case. Of particular
consequence was its inability to properly define the relevant market in
order to establish market dominance. 249
The Commission attempted to establish three particular product sub-
markets: light containers for canned meats; light containers for canned
fish; and metal closures for the canning industry.250 The Court found
two apparently crucial factors missing in the Commission's proof of domi-
nance in those markets. First, an adequate boundary which distinguished
the particular submarkets from alternative product markets was not demon-
strated.25 1 Focusing on potential consumers, the Court indicated that a
sufficient lack of interchangeability had to be demonstrated in order to
merit separate treatment.25 2 On the facts of Continental Can, the Court
indicated that a general market for light metal containers might well have
243. Id.
244. For the text of article 85 (3) (b), see note 03 supra.
245. 2 CCH CoMM. MXT. REP. 1 8171, at 8300.
246. Id. The Court of Justice stated: "Articles 85 and 86 cannot be construed
so as to contradict each other, since they serve for the realization . . . [the] same
objective." Id.
247. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
248. However, one must note the countervailing factor presented by the facts of
this case. Since this expansion involved the significant growth of an outside enter-
prise, perhaps the ordinarily lenient stance taken by the Commission towards con-
centrations was disregarded. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra. The Court,
however, took no judicial recognition of this.
249. While the court rejected the Commission's determination of the relevant
product market, it left unchallenged the Commission's finding that a single country
(Germany) was the proper geographical market against which to measure the firm's
dominance.
250. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8171, at 8301.
251. Id.
252. Id. While the Court of Justice clearly indicated that the Commission's three
proposed submarkets did not merit separate treatment, it failed to articulate specific
guidelines. It did state, however, that the Commission must "define the market to be
considered with sufficient precision to [at least] permit an evaluation of the com-
parative strength of the enterprise on such a market." Id. at 8302.
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been the relevant product market.253 Second, the Court indicated that a
dominant position had not been shown since the particular product might
easily have been supplied through minor alterations by existing competi-
tion.254 This second factor focuses on the ease with which other manufac-
turers might "step into" a market to provide a "serious counterbalance.
'255
SLW's alleged dominance in the proposed submarket could have been effec-
tively countered through industry movement from the general market. 256
Aside from considerations concerning the existence of market domi-
nance, the Commission probably would have failed in proving that the
necessary elimination of competition would have resulted from the merger
action. Since the court discussed the prospect of manufacturers providing
the counterbalance in reference to market dominance,2 57 these same con-
siderations doubtless would have been applied in finding that the Com-
mission had not met its abuse burden of proof by showing that "only
enterprises which in their market conduct are dependent on the dominant
enterprise would remain on the market."
258
C. Implications of the decision
Continental Can appears to advocate a rather structural approach to
the control of merger-induced concentrations. This is especially demon-
strated by the fact that the court found no need for the showing of a causal
connection between the dominant position and the abuse alleged.25 9 The
purchase of TDV stock could have been carried out on the open market
regardless of SLW's dominant position. In fact, acquisition of TDV
stock was achieved totally independently of the product and geographic
market allegedly dominated.2 60  Since the court found the question of
causal connection totally immaterial to article 86's proscription,
261 it
appears that the strengthening of a dominant position can be deemed
abusive regardless of the methods or means used to attain it.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 8301.
255. Id. The Court of Justice also mentioned the potential competition from large
buyers who might start producing for themselves. Id. at 8302.
256. Id. at 8302.
257. Id. at 8301.
258. Id. The court's use of the "serious counterbalance" test in defining market
dominance as well as in the formulation of an abuse standard further muddles the two
concepts. See text accompanying notes 265-67 infra.
259. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8171, at 8300. It should be noted that this view
is in sharp contrast to the prior opinions of many commentators. As one suggested:
It is inherent in the word "exploitation" that there must be a connection between
the market-dominating position and the conduct of the particular enterprise, in
other words, that its dominant market position alone enables the enterprise to
engage in the particular conduct.
A. DERINGER, supra note 130, at 165-66.
260. This point was strenuously argued by Continental's counsel, who contended:
Continental could be charged with violation of Article 86 only if it can be estab-
lished that it used the allegedly dominant position of SLW in the Federal Republic
of Germany to buy the TDV stock in the Netherlands.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8171, at 8287.
261. Id. at 8300.
[VOL. 19
35
Smith: Control of Concentrations in the European Economic Community: Evo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
FEBRUARY 1974]
Article 86 thus would prohibit a merger, regardless of whether it
was made possible by the firm's dominance.262 The decision implies that
even growth justifiable on the grounds of scale efficiencies or internal
expansion might be precluded if it has the prohibited effect. This all-
encompassing reach is compounded by the fact that article 86 does not
provide for specific exemptions as does article 85.263 This sweeping de-
cision, therefore, could have the practical effect of prohibiting market
dominance itself.26 4 While the Court in Continental Can appears to have
initiated a two-level approach, the distinction between the two levels is
not entirely clear. The first stage of market dominance, while certainly
structural in nature, is not defined with clarity. Abuse through merger,
which seems to be on a different plane, is manifested by a lack of the
"sufficient counter-balance" on the part of remaining competitors, but
how this would differ from the mere condition of market dominance is not
entirely certain.26 5 As a result of these somewhat unclear definitions, it
is conceivable that the distinction between the two might become mud-
dled.266 If this happens, it is entirely possible that abusive behavior might
be found, not only from further growth through merger, but also from the
mere activity of doing business as a monopolistic enterprise.267 This would,
of course, have the practical effect of proscribing the mere achievement of
market power, and would operate in a manner even beyond section 2 of
the Sherman Act.
2 68
While Continental Can arguably supplies the Commission with very
broad powers, the power it grants is quite limited in some respects.
Specifically, since proof of a dominant position must be made before a
company may be subjected to the proscriptions of article 86, the article
262. As such, this doctrine arguably transcends United Shoe wherein it was
found that the elimination of competition was effected by conditions which were an
outgrowth of the advantages resulting from United's market power. 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See notes 183-85 and
accompanying text supra.
263. These exemption sections would permit cartel agreements where certain
beneficial effects were shown. See note 114 and accompanying text supra. Since
exemptions are lacking in article 86's formulation, it would perhaps give the Commis-
sion even wider powers against concentrations.
264. See text accompanying note 357 infra.
265. This had been particularly bothersome to the behaviorists. R. JOLIET, supra
note 22, at 292.
266. This is evident from the use of the same determinative factors in the defini-
tion of market dominance and abuse.
267. Article 86 was adjudged to ensure respect of the article 3(f) principles that
call for undistorted competition. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8171, at 8300. Com-
petition is distorted by a monopolistic power no matter how it achieved that position.
Thus, if the Court extends its rationale to its logical conclusion, it appears that article
86 might be violated by the mere existence of the monopolistic enterprise. See note
357 and accompanying text infra.
268. Even Alcoa, the strongest American case so far against achievement of
market influence, would allow a monopoly power to exist where such power was
found to have been "thrust upon it." See notes 133-35 and accompanying text supra.
Article 86 would not seem to provide for such an excuse, arguably finding a violation
whenever the principles of article 3(f) were not respected. Continental Can, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 1 8171, at 8300. Viewed in a structural manner, undistorted com-
petition would preclude monopoly power no matter how it was achieved.
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cannot be utilized to prevent the merger of two companies when neither
of them had maintained the status of market dominance before such acquisi-
tion.26 9 A merger between non-dominant firms would be permitted even
when the combined enterprises would control the market to such a degree
that the merger would have been regarded as abusive within the meaning
of Continental Can had one of the firms been initially declared dominant.
Thus, as long as the contemplated merger is between non-dominant firms,
it would not be prohibited by article 86.270
The Continental Can interpretation of article 86 thus does not provide
the possible foundation for a prophylactic rule of a Clayton-type variety.2 71
As amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act, section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits dangerous mergers in their incipiency by providing, in part
"that no corporation ... shall acquire, directly or indirectly ... stock...
or assets of another corporation ... where . . . the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly. 21 2 The failure of article 86 to combat acquisitions which may
create future competition problems could undermine a true competition
policy. The Continental Can use of article 86 against mergers and con-
centrations has armed the Commission with more of a bludgeon than a
sword. It certainly would appear to provide a less than adequate founda-
tion for an intelligent and comprehensive system of control. Recognizing
this, the Commission has looked elsewhere for a workable scheme.
VI. PROPOSED MERGER REGULATION
27 3
On July 20, 1973, the Commission announced its proposal for a new,
sweeping regulation to control merger-produced concentrations in the
EEC.2 7 4 Although its ultimate acceptance by the Council is still hardly
imminent27 5 and somewhat speculative, 76 the proposal itself indicates a
recognition of the need for an extensive revamping in this area. Article
85, while perhaps applicable to some concentrations, does not cover all
mergers. And, although article 86 is conceptually sufficient to provide
broad controls, the Court of Justice has demanded a high burden of proof
which must be met by the Commission in order to sustain an action.
269. The proposed merger regulation was inspired in part by this inadequacy.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9302 (1973).
270. Thus, it appears that five enterprises, each of which controls 20 per cent of
the market might all merge with impunity.
271. However, note that article 85, if deemed applicable to concentrations, might
apply to such "incipiency" situations as it does not require proof of market dominance.
272. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
273. Text of Proposed Regulation may be found in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9586, at 9303-04 (1973).
274. The text of the final draft regulation was approved on July 18, 1973, and
announced in Brussels on July 20, 1973. Id.
275. The Council will hold a discussion on the subject by May 1, 1974, and expects
to take action by January 1, 1975. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9624, at 9400 (1974).
276. See notes 344-54 and accompanying text infra.
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the Commission went beyond the
competition articles and employed article 235277 as the basis for its pro-
posed regulation. This "catch-all" section provides that the Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, may enact any new measures or provide the powers needed in
order to attain the objectives of the Treaty.278 Based on this provision
as well as on articles 86 and 87, the proposed regulation would completely
replace regulation 17 in the area of concentrations, thereby effectively
eliminating the use of articles 85 and 86 in the field.27
9
A. Inspirations for a new system
The need for a new, systematic regulatory scheme in the area of con-
centrations has become almost universally recognized throughout the Com-
munity. As early as 1969, the Council stressed the urgency of formulating
a clearly defined program. 28 0  In Continental Can, the Court of Justice
strongly emphasized the need for the development of a Treaty system
which would ensure the undistorted competition called for in article 3 (f).281
At the Paris Summit Conference of October 19-21, 1972, the participants
called for the formulation of new measures to ensure that mergers affecting
Community firms were in harmony with the economic and social aims
of the EEC.28 2 In order to maintain such a system, they agreed that it
was desirable to make the "widest possible use"28 of all Treaty provisions,
including article 235.
It was the Parliament, however, that laid the real conceptual ground-
work, formulating the principles that eventually were to be adopted in the
Commission proposal. In the formal Resolution of June 7, 1971, the
European Parliament demanded:
that for concentrations which exceed a certain share of the market or
a certain size there should be prior notification; such concentrations
should be regarded as authorized only if the Commission does not
raise any objection within a time-limit yet to be fixed.
28 4
277. Article 235 is set forth in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 5325 (1968).
278. Id.
279. However, many of the old features of regulation 17 would be incorporated.
Cf. notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
280. O.J. No. L129, May 30, 1969, at 23.
281. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. RFP. 1 8171, at 8299.
282. Debates of the European Parliament, O.J. No. L158, Feb. 12, 1973, at 15
(Berkouwer Report) (remarks of Mr. Borschette).
283. Id.
284. EEC Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, July 12, 1973, at 2 (Communication from
Mr. Borschette) (annex 2) (Explanatory Memorandum) quoting, Resolution of the
European Parliament on the Rules of Competition and the Position of European
Undertakings in the Common Market and in the World Economy, O.J. No. C66,
July 1, 1971, at 9.
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The concept of a notification requirement coupled with an authorization
provision was thus introduced. The Commission developed the idea into
a concrete proposal containing 22 articles.
285
B. Mechanics of the proposal
1. Scope
The all-encompassing reach of the proposal is suggested in its article
[R] 1(1)286 which would subject to regulation all transactions having the
direct or indirect effect of bringing about a concentration between under-
takings which enhances "the power to hinder effective competition" in the
common market.287 This article makes it possible to deal with all but the
most insignificant mergers within the Community.
288
The definition of concentration, located in article [R]2,28 9 turns on
the concept of control. The requisite control over an acquired enterprise
is found where there is either a right or a contract which "makes it possible
to determine how an undertaking shall operate. '290 This term cuts through
legal formalities and views the principle in the context of any real enter-
prise influence. The presence or absence of a "legal or economic entity"
thereby becomes an insignificant consideration. Rights to assets, power
to manage or influence, stake in the profits, or contracts of more than a
commercial nature all may manifest this control.
2 91
Only concentrations which "enhance the power to hinder effective
competition"29 2 are proscribed. This provision, which should not be con-
fused with either the term "dominant position" or "abuse" within the
meaning of article 86, is intended to be very broad in its scope. Reflected
in the proposal's proscription will probably be all of the extralegel con-
siderations inherent in the competition policy. Thus, not only would
traditional market structure criteria be used in the determination, but also
such factors as special availability of technical knowledge, raw materials,
285. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303-4 (1973). (In order to avoid
confusion, the article numbers of the proposed regulation will be designated by [R]Y.
286. Article [R]1(1) provides:
1. Any transaction which has the direct or indirect effect of bringing about a
concentration between undertakings or groups of undertakings, at least one of
which is established in the common market, whereby they acquire or enhance
the power to hinder effective competition in the common market or in a substan-
tial part thereof, is incompatible with the common market in so far as the con-
centration may affect trade between Member States.
The power to hinder effective competition shall be appraised by reference in
particular to the extent to which suppliers and consumers have a possibility of
choice, to the economic and financial power of the undertakings concerned, to the
structure of the markets affected, and to supply and demand trends for the relevant
goods or services.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 9586, at 9303 (1973).
287. Id.
288. See notes 297-99 and accompanying text infra.
289. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9303-2 (1973). A portion of the text
of Article [R]2 is set forth in note 327 infra.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See the text of article [R] 1(1) set forth in note 286 supra.
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or outside finance as well as special links with suppliers, resellers, or
third-country undertakings.
Article [R] 1 does include a provision which would exclude from the
regulation concentrations in which the aggregate turnover of the partici-
pating undertakings is less than 200 million units of account (UA), and
in which the share of the market in terms of the goods or services involved
does not exceed 25 per cent in any one member country.293 Article [R]5
stipulates that in the calculation of this aggregate turnover, both the enter-
prises directly participating in the concentration as well as all other under-
takings in a control relationship with the participants shall be included.
294
Presumably, concentrations which are indispensable to the attainment of a
Community objective will also be immune from regulation.295 However,
there are certain conceptual difficulties in the application of this exemption
which will be discussed later.
296
The scope of the regulation thus includes nearly all mergers of any
significant size involving a Community enterprise. Even transactions
involving third-country enterprises in an indirect way would be subject
to the proposal.297 Whether of the horizontal, vertical or conglomerate
type,298 and whether or not they involve undertakings in a dominant posi-
tion within the meaning of article 86, merger-produced2 9 9 concentrations
deemed likely to prevent effective competition within the common market
may be declared incompatible with Community interests.
2. Operating procedure
The operative standard, "enhance the power to hinder competition in
the common market or in a substantial part thereof' is left largely unde-
fined; the Commission is granted the exclusive competence to determine
the "compatibility" of the proposed concentration, subject only to review
293. Article [R]l(2), 2 CCH COMM. MXT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303 (1973).
294. Article [R]5(1) provides:
1. (a) The aggregate turnover specified in Articles 1(2) and 4(1) shall be
obtained by adding together the turnover for the last financial year for all goods
and services of:
(i) the undertakings participating in the concentration;
(ii) the undertakings and groups of undertakings which control the under-
takings participating in the concentration within the meaning of Article 2;
(iii) the undertakings or groups of undertakings controlled within the mean-
ing of Article 2 by the undertakings participating in the concentration.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9303-3 (1973).
295. Article [R]1(3) provides:
3. Paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable to concentrations
which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective which is given priority
treatment in the common interest of the Community.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303 (1973).
296. See notes 339-43 and accompanying text infra.
297. This is made clear in the Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 284, at 8.
298. Id. at 9.
299. The Commission stated: "[I]nternal growth . .. which does not fall under
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by the Court of Justice.300 In this role, the Commission has been given
the right to deal with concentrations both before and after the merger
has been consummated.
Post-merger action is dealt with in article [R]3(3), which grants
the Commission the power to take any action to restore the condition of
effective competition.3 01 Separation of assets, dissolution of control, or any-
thing else "appropriate" may be demanded.30 2 Such compliance orders are
backed with substantial fines for each day of delay under article [R] 14.303
However, it is merger prevention rather than post-concentration
divestiture that forms the heart of the proposed system. This is achieved
by means of a conclusive clearance procedure whereby the Commission
may judge a contemplated merger on the basis of information supplied
through a mandatory pre-merger notification requirement. Pursuant to
this plan, article [R]4304 demands that where a proposed merger involves
300. Article [R]3(1), (4), (5), provides that:
1. When the Commission finds that a concentration is caught by Article
1(1) and that the conditions laid down in Article 1(3) are not satisfied, it shall
issue a decision declaring the concentration to be incompatible with the Common
Market.
4. When the Commission finds that a concentration is caught by Article
1(1) and that the conditions laid down in Article 1(3) are satisfied, it shall issue
a decision declaring Article 1(1) to be inapplicable; conditions and obligations
may be attached thereto.
5. Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole
power to take [sic] the decisions provided for in this article.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 9586, at 9303-2 (1973).
301. Article [R]3(3) states:
3. Where a concentration has already been put into effect, the Commission
may require, by decision taken under paragraph 1 or by a separate decision, the
undertakings or assets acquired or concentrated to be separated or the cessation
of common control or any other action that may be appropriate in order to restore
conditions of effective competition.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9303-2 (1973).
302. Id. However, the Commission's right is qualified somewhat in Article
[R]3(2) :
2. The decision by which the Commission declares a concentration to be
incompatible within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall not automatically render
null and void the legal transactions relating to such operation.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303-2 (1973). This would avoid the problem
which was partly responsible for the Commission's decision not to apply Article 85 to
concentrations. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text supra.
303. Article [R] 14 would permit periodic penalty payments up to 25,000 units of
account for each day of delay. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303-5 (1973).
304. Article [R]4(1) and (2) stipulates that:
1. Concentrations shall be notified to the Commission before they are put into
effect, where the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned is not less
than one thousand million units of account.
2. Where concentrations proposed by an undertaking or a group of under-
takings have already reached or exceeded the amounts referred to in paragraph 1,
they shall be exempted from the obligation of prior notification, if the turnover
of the undertaking the control of which they propose to acquire is less than 30
million units of account.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 9586, at 9303-2 (1973).
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enterprises with an aggregate turnover3 0 5 of at least one billion UA806
and the turnover of the acquired undertaking exceeds 30 million UA ,
a°
the Commission must be formally notified of the plan. This sales turnover
would include the annual receipts of not only the undertakings directly
involved, but also of all firms participating even indirectly in the merger
transaction. 0 8 Article [R]6(1)309 provides that the Commission may
then commence proceedings against any concentration likely to fall within
the "incompatibility" standard of the [R1 1(1) proscription.
The draft regulation provides that firms which have complied with
this notification procedure may be given assurance, by a period of Com-
munity inaction, that the proposed merger is conclusively approved.
Article [R]6(2) °10 demands that the Commission initiate any proceeding
against the contemplated concentration within three months after receipt
of the completed notification or else such concentration will be presumed
"compatible" with the common market under article [R16(4). 811 Once
a decision has been made to commence proceedings against a planned
merger, article [R]17(1)(a) 12 dictates that a final decision be made
within the next nine months. Firms which give proper notification will,
therefore, presumably know the fate of their proposal within one year:
three months for the commencement of proceedings followed by a final
decision within the subsequent nine months. This period may be altered
305. Turnover criteria were favored over a market share test since the former are
less difficult to determine and thus more suitable as a workable basis. Interview with
Mme. Tobias Espion, Commission competition staff member, assistant to the director-
general, in Brussels, July 19, 1973. Mine. Espion took an active part in drafting the
proposal.
306. Article [R]4(1), 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 9586, at 9303-2 (1973). For
the text of article [R]4(1), see note 304 supra.
307. Article [R]4(2). 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 9586, at 9303-2 (1973). For
the text of article [R]4(2), see note 304 supra.
308. Thus, the turnover of the parent firm of the participating enterprise would
be included in the calculation.
309. Article [R]6(1) provides:
1. Where the Commission considers that a concentration is likely to become
the subject of a decision under Article 1 (1) or (3), it shall commence proceedings
and so inform the undertakings in question and the competent authorities in the
Member States.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. % 9586, at 9303-3 (1973).
310. Article [R]6(2) provides:
2. As regards concentrations notified to it, the Commission shall commence
proceedings within a period not exceeding 3 months unless the relevant under-
takings agree to extend that period. The period of 3 months shall commence on
the day following receipt of the notification, or if the information to be supplied
with the notification is incomplete, on the day following the receipt of the com-
lete information.
2 C(CH COMM. MXT. REP. 9586, at 9303-3 (1973).
311. Article [R]6(4) provides:
4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, a concentration notified to the Com-
mission shall be presumed to be compatible with the common market if the
Commission does not commence proceedings before expiration of the period
specified in paragraph 2.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9303-3 (1973).
312. Article [R]17(1) (a) provides:
1. (a) Decisions under Article 3(1) and (4) shall be taken within 9 months
following the date of commencement of proceedings, save where there is agree-
ment with the relevant undertakings to extend that period.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303-5 (1973).
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in certain circumstances. The three month commencement period may be
lengthened under article [R]6(3) 313 if supplied information is false or
misleading and shortened under article [R]7(1)31 4 upon the Commis-
sion's prior approval of the merger; the nine month period may be extended
under article [R] 17(1) (b) 31' in the event special information is required
by the Commission for its proceeding, pursuant to article [R] 10.316
While only concentrations involving enterprises with an aggregate
turnover of at least one billion UA fall within article [R]4's mandatory
notification provision, 317 enterprises involving a smaller turnover may de-
sire to notify the Commission so that they may benefit from article [R]6's
"presumption through inaction." Article [R]4(4) 318 thus permits volun-
tary submission to notification. Such action would allow the firm the
positive clearance assurances of articles [R]6 and [R]17319 although it
would preclude, under article [R]7(1),320 the contemplated merger dur-
ing the three month waiting period.
The Commission is given wide powers in conducting its proceedings
under the proposed regulation. Broad investigatory powers are granted
under article [R] 12,321 which allows the Commission to secure any
needed corporate books or records, and are facilitated by the grant of full
rights to enter the premises of any involved enterprise. Article [R] 11322
guarantees the cooperation of competent authorities of the member states
in conducting such investigations. Finally, certain procedural safeguards
are granted and obligations are imposed upon enterprises involved with
the Commission hearings. Most of these follow the procedural system of
the present regulation 17323 and are thus generally familiar. 324
C. Origin of operative terms
Comparison of the new proposal to the system employed by the ECSC
is tempting. Article 66325 of that Treaty calls for a very broad authorization
system dealing with concentrations. Section 1 provides, in relevant part:
313. Id. at 9303-3.
314. Article [R]7(1) provides:
1. Undertakings shall not put into effect a concentration notified to the
Commission before the end of the time limit provided for in Articles 6(2) unless
the Commission informs them before the end of the time limit that it is not
necessary to commence proceedings.
2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9303-3 (1973).
315. Id. at 9303-5.
316. Id. at 9303-3 to -4.
317. See note 304 supra wherein the text of article [R]4 is set forth in part.
318. Article [R]4(4) provides:
4. Concentrations which are not caught by paragraph 1 may nevertheless be
notified to the Commission before they are put into effect.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. f 9586, at 9303-2 (1973).
319. See notes 310-12 and accompanying text supra.
320. The text of article [R]7(1) is set forth in note 314 supra.
321. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586, at 9304-4 to -5 (1973).
322. Id. at 9303-04.
323. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
324. See 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 11 2401-2633.
325. TREATIES, supra note 34, at 64-69.
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Any transaction shall require prior authorization of the High Au-
thority [equivalent to the Commission in the EEC] . . . if it has the
direct or indirect effect of bringing about . . . a concentration between
undertakings . . . whether it is effected by merger, acquisition of
shares or parts of the undertaking or assets, loan, contract or any
other means of control.
26
Certainly the concept of control in the proposed regulation was largely
inspired by the ECSC article. In fact, the elements mentioned in article
[R]2 of the proposal concerning what constitutes control follow almost
verbatim the first decision by the High Authority (1954) interpreting
section 1 of article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.3
27
Yet, it is important to note the difference in approach between the
systems. Prior authorization under the ECSC Treaty required the High
Authority to act on all merger requests by deciding on the merits of each
application.3 28 On the other hand, the EEC proposal, with its "acceptance
through non-action" policy, would require the Commission to take affirma-
tive action only where it was deemed necessary. This would, of course,
severely reduce the administrative burden of implementing the new scheme.
One of the drafters of the new proposal cited these practical considerations
326. Id. at 64.
327. Compare Article [R]2(2) of proposal which provides:
2. Control is constituted by rights or contracts which, either separately or
jointly, and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, make it
possible to determine how an undertaking shall operate, and particularly by:
(1) Ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an un-
dertaking;
(2) Rights or contracts which confer the power to influence the composi-
tion, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking;
(3) Rights or contracts which make it possible to manage the business
of an undertaking;
(4) Contracts made with an undertaking concerning the computation or
appropriation of its profits;
(5) Contracts made with an undertaking concerning the whole or an
important part of supplies or outlets, where the duration of these contracts or
the quantities to which they relate exceed what is usual in commercial contracts
dealing with those matters.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 9586, at 9303-2 (1973), with the definition of control set
forth in the decision by the High Authority in one of its earliest actions:
Les droits ou contrats mentionne~s ci-apr~s constituent les 6lments de
contr6le d'une entreprise lorsqu'ils conf rent, seuls ou conjointement et compte
tenu des circonstances de fait ou de droit, la possibilit6 de d6terminer l'action
d'une entreprise dans les domaines de la production, des prix, des investissements,
des approvisionnements, des ventes ou de l'affectation des b~n~fices:
1) Droit de propri~t6 ou de jouissance sur tout ou partie des biens d'une
entreprise,
2) Droits ou contrats qui conf~rent une influence sur la composition, les
d~librations ou les d&cisions des organes d'une entreprise,
3) Droits ou contrats permettant i. une personne, seule ou avec d'autres, de
grer les affaires d'une entreprise,
4) Contrats relatifs . la comptabilisation ou A l'affectation des b~nifices
d'une entreprise,
5) Contrats relatifs i la totalit6 ou A une partie importante des approvision-
nements ou des d~bouch~s d'une entreprise, lorsque ces contrats d~passent
en quantitE ou en duroe la porte usuelle des contrats commerciaux en
la matire.
High Authority Decision No. 24/25 of May 6, 1954, ECSC Journal Officiel, May 11,
1954, at 345.
328. ECSC article 66(1). TREATIES, supra note 34, at 64.
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as the principal reason for rejecting a regulatory process patterned after
the ECSC approach.
2 9
The drafters were also somewhat influenced by the relatively sophisti-
cated British system of concentration control.38 0 The Monopolies and
Mergers Act, 1965,831 is one of the few European enactments allowing
governmental regulation of concentrations through divestiture. With re-
gard to mergers, that Act provides that any acquisition involving a mini-
mum asset takeover or market extension can be referred by a Board of
Trade (BOT) to the Monopolies Commission (MC) which has the right
to undertake analysis and make recommendations. 38 2 The MC is specific-
ally charged with determining whether the merger violates "the public
interest," although this term is not really defined. 88 The BOT reviews
the determination and decides what action should be taken. The EEC
proposal shares the British policy of subjecting only certain, minimally-
sized concentrations to review. Yet, the drafters did not care to have a
system of two-level review, preferring to integrate the scheme through a
built-in exemption. Also, the British system does not provide for an
advanced notification procedure.
The system of pre-merger mandatory notice appears to have been
inspired by American law. Although the competition staff members, with
whom the writer spoke, did mention general American influence in the
development of EEC antitrust principles, none mentioned any specific
provisions used in formulating the proposal. It seems inescapably clear,
however, that the notification procedure was largely influenced by the
FTC merger notification system effective April 4, 1972. as 4 In a 1969
resolution,as5 the FTC initiated a system requiring notification of con-
templated mergers and the submission of "special reports" under certain
circumstances. For each acquisition within its jurisdiction of a firm with
assets or sales of $10 million or more, with total assets or sales among all
the concerned enterprises exceeding $250 million, the FTC would require
the filing of a special report within 10 days after the merger agreement
is reached and no less than 60 days prior to consummation of the merger
329. Espion interview, supra note 305.
330. Id. While the act is sophisticated relative to other European enactments, it
has been described as "laughable" compared to American antitrust law. Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, International Aspects of Antitrust, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 331
(1966) (statement by Mr. Schwartz).
331. The Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, C.50. For a detailed description of
the act, see Note, Public Control of Mergers, 28 MOD. L. REv. 654 (1965). See also
C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 365-68 (1967) ; R. JOLIET, supra
note 22, at 176-90.
332. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 183-85.
333. Id. at 179.
334. 37 Fed. Reg. 7951-52 (1972). This conclusion has been reached by several
European lawyers including the French firm, Gide, Loyrette & Nouel, which was
involved with the Continental Can case. See Gide, Loyrette & Nouel, Dictionnaire du
Marche Commun, No. 65, June 1973, at 11-12.
335. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 4540, at 6929 (1973).
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or acquisition. Acquisition achieved through either sale of assets or 10
per cent ownership of voting stocks would he included.3836
There are two differences between the FTC procedure and the EEC
proposal. First, the FTC 60 day requirement may be lessened to "as
promptly as possible" should exceptional circumstances warrant;387 the
time limit was not intended as a waiting period, unlike the three month
limit in the EEC proposal. Second, the FTC has made it clear that the
mere fact that it has not challenged a merger prior to its consummation
should not be interpreted as approval of the legality of the transaction,3 38
while under the proposed regulation the EEC Commission would appear
to sanction any such transaction carried out after the waiting period.
D. Conceptual difficulties
In light of the almost unlimited powers given to the Commission in
determining whether a proposed concentration is "compatible," the legal
effect of the article [R]1(3) 339 exemption is not clear. It declares that
the basic proscription of article [R] 1(1) may be deemed inapplicable to
concentrations which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective
which is to be given priority treatment. 40 This provision, included largely
upon the insistence of Commissioner Albert Borschette,8 4x was meant to
make the proposal more politically palatable. It was, therefore, designed
to integrate the competition policy with other specific Community objec-
tives, perhaps softening an ordinarily harsh stance where other Community
policies would be adversely affected. One example cited to the writer
particularly involved deference to the regional policy. A contemplated
merger, which would effect a total monopoly on the market and thus be
prohibited in most areas, might be permitted in a particularly undeveloped
market, such as southern Italy, if it could be shown that overall industrial
development would thereby be encouraged.
3 42
Whether the provision has the effect of limiting Commission power
is, however, far from clear. The explanatory letter accompanying the
proposal explicitly states that article [R] 1(3) does not have the effect of
a legal exception. 43 It thus seems hardly more than a manifestation of
Commission intentions, certainly not the legal basis for challenging Com-
mission action before the Court of Justice. One possible explanation for
its non-legal status is that the Commission may not want to reduce any of
the power bestowed by Continental Can. The Court of Justice, under its
notion of abuse, would not require that a Commission action be coupled
336. 37 Fed. Reg. 7951-52 (1972).
337. 1 CCH TuRE REG. REP. 1 4540, at 6936 (1973).
338. 37 Fed. Reg. 7952 (1972).
339. For the text of article [R]I (3), see note 295 supra.
340. Id.
341. Espion interview, supra note 305.
342. Id.
343. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 284, at 10.
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with a showing that it would not adversely affect other Community policies.
Since the proposed regulation would replace article 86 as the anti-
concentration tool, the Commission apparently attempted to ensure that
all of its previous power would be retained.
E. Chances for acceptance
As previously noted, article 235 requires unanimity among Council
members, directly representing their member States, to pass the Commis-
sion proposal.84 4 Aside from the inevitable industrial lobbying, there are
a number of political and legal considerations which could conceivably
force an alteration or rejection of the plan.
Since Treaty law must be applied in conjunction with the antitrust
proscriptions of the national laws, it is quite obvious that the potentially
far-reaching rules may be quite incompatible with the regulatory schemes
of the member states. Particularly where antitrust restrictions are rather
lenient, the national may be unwilling to compromise its policies in the
name of the Community interest. Belgium, for example, imposes national
controls which are relatively favorable to the formation of economic
power. 345 The Belgian statutes, which are not opposed to the develop-
ment of market dominant firms by way of mergers, call only for supervision
by administrative enforcement of firms' behavior.3 4 6 Exclusionary prac-
tices, however coercive or predatory, would not be subject to corrective
action.34 7 The EEC proposal thus would have the affect of radically
altering the Belgian stance as to concentrations.
Of even greater consequence is the possible infringement of the new
controls on the very political posture of the member state. The Commis-
sion made it explicitly clear, in the press conference announcement of the
proposal, that no exceptions would be made for public, as opposed to private
concentrations of economic power.348 One particularly bothersome ques-
tion is the potential effect of the Commission policy on the large Italian
governmental holding companies. 34 9 Certainly such concentrations could
jeopardize economic integration and the development of a Community-
wide economy, yet in the final analysis this concern must be balanced by
344. See note 278 and accompanying text supra.
345. See Seutens, Belgian Antitrust Law "In Action," 2 CoMm. MKT. L. REV. 325
(1965). The law does not take a stand for or against economic power. Id. at 326.
346. Id. at 327-28. See C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES
344 (1967).
347. R. JOLIET, supra note 22, at 147.
348. This concern was evidenced by at least one question directed to the Com-
mission at the press conference:
[Q. directed to Mr. Borschette] The frontier between the public and private
sectors is sometimes not very well defined. What happens if an enterprise con-
trolled by the state undertakes certain control operations or merger operations.
I'm thinking particularly of the Italian holding companies. Are they covered by
this regulation?
[A.] The case you mention is, in fact, covered.
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some recognition of national sovereignty. This will likely be a point of
compromise to be reflected in the final form of the regulation.
Recent events have also indicated that the proposed regulation, even
if accepted, is likely to be somewhat watered down. 350 At present the cry
for national egoism among the member states has drowned the plea for
Community unity. 351 One manifestation of this present disharmony has
been the European Parliament's slim rejection of the proposal, made
possible through the general boycott of Britain's Labour members.3 52
While the Parliament has only a consultative function at this time, the
rejection is significant in light of the Assembly's one time enthusiastic
promotion of the principles involved.353 Thus, the proposal should find
an even more fundamental resistance on the part of the Council of Minis-
ers when it decides the ultimate fate of the Regulation by January 1, 1975.
It appears likely that a compromise stance will be taken by the Commis-
sion before submission of a final proposal to the Council. Commissioner
Albert Borschette has already indicated a possible willingness to modify
certain of the proposal's provisions. 314
VII. CONCLUSION
Continental Can and the Commission's proposed regulations evidence
a rapid evolution in the ECC's control of concentrations. However, this
has not been without certain growing pains, and competition policy in the
area of close-knit combinations remains in an "awkward stage," encoun-
tering certain conceptual difficulties on the way to maturity.
The difficulties are caused primarily by the fact that neither article
85 nor 86 is really an adequate basis for comprehensive control. One
explanation for the lack of a truly adequate article is that the drafters of
the Rome Treaty, viewing concentrations as fundamentally important to
the development of an integrated European economy, sought to avoid any
real legal or psychological obstacles to their development.35 5 Article 85
was designed to attack only the less beneficial cartels while article 86
permitted the maintenance of dominant market power, subject only to a
degree of control over economic exploitation of that power. Article 86
appears to seek the best of both worlds - the Community would reap
the benefits of concentrations while consumers would be protected from
the dangers. It appears inescapably clear that since only a misuse of a
dominant position was to be prohibited, article 86 originally had a pure
abuse orientation; concentrations could grow with absolute impunity as
long as they "behaved."
350. CCH Common Market Rep., Euromarket News, No. 263 (pt. 1), Jan. 30,
1974, at 2-3.
351. TIME, Feb. 11, 1974, at 38; Prinsky, The Common Market's Dishevelment,
Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1974, at 14, col. 4 (Eastern ed.).
352. Euromarket News, supra note 350, at 2-3.
353. See notes 284-85 and accompanying text supra.
354. Euromarket News, supra note 350, at 2-3.
355. Commission Memorandum, supra note 31, at 9.
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However, in what appears to have been the recognition of the in-
adequacies of such a formulation, the Commission sought to inject struc-
tured elements into article 86's prohibition. It now considers the term
"abuse" to include not only economic exploitation, but also the growth
of a dominant enterprise by merger. As this involves a purely structural
matter, this interpretation strains the article 86 formulation. First, none
of article 86's four illustrative examples seem to classify merger activity
as within the scope of such misuse. Second, the Commission's reading
requires the formulation of separate levels of market power. Exactly
how much further growth of an already dominant firm must take place
before being deemed an abuse is not delineated. Why the article did not
indicate that there might be "quanta of concentration" involved in its
operation is similarly unclear. Third, even if these issues were settled, it
appears doubtful that article 86 was meant to be read so as to reach an
abuse that was achieved totally independently of the firm's dominant
position. It is difficult to understand how an activity that has been main-
tained independently of the firm's market power can be deemed "abuse
of a dominant position." Prohibition of the Continental Can-type merger,
however, clearly requires such a reading.
In spite of these conceptual difficulties, the Court of Justice gave
judicial approval to the Commission's interpretation of the article. While
the tortured reading of article 86 can be partially explained by the teleo-
logical interpretation of Community law,3 56 that emphasis on the pro-
motion of fundamental Treaty aims may have extensive ramifications.
Specifically, while it is true that market power alone is still presumably
immune from the reach of article 86, further erosion of the concept of
abuse might put this principle in jeopardy as well. One of the underlying
rationales of the Court in Continental Can was that the policy of article
3(f) - undistorted competition - would be violated where the merger-
produced growth might constitute a danger of weakened competition. 5"
However, this danger would be presented by monopoly power no matter
how it was achieved, and the principle of article 3(f) could be violated
by any monopoly power simply doing business. Since it is the monopoly
power that creates the danger and not necessarily the means of its achieve-
ment, the Court's rationale would appear to strike at the market position
itself. As abuse has taken on this structural connotation, article 86 would
now appear to implicitly outlaw all enterprise concentration achieving the
proscribed level.
So construed, article 86 would not only take the final step toward a
purely structural orientation, but would seem to go beyond section 2 of
the Sherman Act. Even the Alcoa decision, which went the farthest
towards finding a monopoly power tantamount to illegal monopolization,
recognized certain legitimate "excuses" for monopoly power, as where
356. See note 88 supra.
357. 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. ff 8171, at 8300.
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monopoly was "thrust upon" the organization involved. The Commission's
interpretation of article 86, if taken to its logical conclusion, would pre-
sumably find monopoly power to be abuse regardless of the means by
which it was achieved.
While the court's decision may contain strained legal reasoning, it is
understandable in light of the circumstances presented. The Commission
was waiting for the Continental Can decision before introducing its pro-
posed merger regulation. While receiving enthusiastic backing for this
comprehensive regulatory scheme from the Parliament as well as tenta-
tive approval by the Council, the Commission apparently sought some
support from the Court of Justice before attempting to actually intro-
duce such broad controls. If the Commission could back its proposal with
a showing that it already had widespread article 86 powers, the proposed
plan would be more palatable to the Council members. Thus, it is sub-
mitted that the Court, realizing that such a regulation was necessary to
carry out the principle of article 3(f), may have stretched the article 86
interpretation to show the needed support. That the two events may
have been so connected is partly evidenced by the fact that the new
proposal, if adopted, would totally preempt the use of article 86 in the
area of concentrations.
Whether or not the merger regulations are accepted in their final
form, it is clear that concentrations in the EEC are becoming subject to
rapidly expanding control. Article 86 has proven to be an effective tool in
halting growth-through-merger of a dominant firm. The proposed regula-
tion would apply to the small as well as the dominant enterprise. Both
recent developments indicate uncontrolled concentrations are a business
luxury of the past. They also make clear that, notwithstanding appear-
ances to be contrary, EEC law has chosen the American tradition of a
structurally-oriented control of concentrations, a fact which has recently
excited some commentators into speculating about the eventual creation
of a common trans-Atlantic merger policy 358 On a more practical level,
however, this development should be strong caveat to the American enter-
prise operating within the EEC - foreign expansion may now be subject
to further reaching regulation.
Stephen F. Smith
358. See Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust
Low, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 75, 93-94 (1973).
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